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THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE:
SOCIAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE
EUTHANASIA DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Roger S. Magnusson
t
Abstract: This paper reviews social and legal issues in the current euthanasia
debate. Focusing on Australia and the United States, the author argues that the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") and/or active voluntary euthanasia
("AVE") is inevitable within the short to medium term, given recent developments
which have undermined the sanctity of life ethic. Legal factors supporting this
assessment include the changing definition of death, the growth of a legally-
recognized right to self-determination extending to the withdrawal of life-support,
and the recognition by some courts that life support may be withdrawn without
consent because life is considered to be futile. The law, in turn, reflects broader
changes in prevailing social philosophies that have been greatly influenced by rising
individualism, the technological revolution in medicine and the promotion of debate
through television and other media. Public opinion polls, the fragmentation of
medical opinion over PAS/AVE and the declining influence of churches are also
creating the conditions under which legalization would be a viable social policy.
This paper reviews the emerging jurisprudence establishing a fight to die in
Australia, the United States and the Netherlands. In view of the likelihood of
PAS/AVE reform, the author argues that it is vital to articulate a stable philosophical
basis for PAS/AVE which will provide a principled basis for any further incremental
derogation from the sanctity of life ethic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On March 25 1995, seven Australian doctors went public on the
front page of a major Melbourne daily. In an open letter to the Victorian
State Premier,' they admitted to having performed euthanasia, and called
for the introduction of the assisted suicide Bill advocated by the Voluntary
Euthanasia Society of Victoria.2 The protest by the "Melbourne Seven"
led to renewed media coverage of a controversy which is rapidly
Lecturer, University of Sydney School of Law; B.A., L.L.B. (Hons) (A.N.U.) (1988), PhD
(Melb.) (1994). This paper was written while the author was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Faculty
of Law, University of Melbourne. This research is supported by an Australian Commonwealth AIDS
Postdoctoral Research Fellowship from the Commonwealth Department of Human Services and
Health. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Peter H. Ballis, Department of Humanities & Social
Sciences, Monash University (Gippsland), for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this
paper.
I Australia, like the United States, is a federal constitutional democracy consisting of six states
(New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania) and two
mainland territories (the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). At both state and
federal level, it follows a Westminster style of government. The leader of the government of a state is
called the Premier; the leader of the government of a territory is called the Chief Minister, while the
leader of the federal government is the Prime Minister. See. e.g., Michelle Grattan, Premiers Propose
"Hands-Off Approach, THE AGE (Melb.), Dec. 7, 1992 at 1.
2 "Right to die" societies are known as "voluntary euthanasia societies" in Australia.
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intensifying in Australia, the United States and other industrial
democracies. Referring to the legal prohibition upon euthanasia, the
doctors wrote,
[i]t cannot be right to tolerate this totally unsatisfactory
situation, where it is a matter of chance whether patients will
receive the treatment which they so desperately seek and
where it must be only a matter of time before some doctor is
prosecuted by the state for following the dictates of his
conscience.3
Almost immediately, the seven were attacked by a spokesperson for
the Premier (who had not been forewarned about the letter), by the
Victorian branch of the Australian Medical Association (AMA), by "right-
to-life" advocates, and other groups.4  An Opposition call for a
Parliamentary inquiry into euthanasia was rejected,5 although the Premier
expressed personal support for legalized voluntary euthanasia, and,
following the enactment of the Northern Territory's recent euthanasia
legislation,6 foreshadowed that Parliament would consider the issue during
1996. 7 Subsequently, however, in response to an appeal by seventy
Victorian doctors, the Premier indicated that his government would not be
considering euthanasia in the "foreseeable future."
'8
In mid-1995, the Medical Practitioners' Board of Victoria and the
Victoria Police held inquiries into the admissions made by the seven
doctors, although in the absence of corroborative evidence and of further
self-incriminating details from the doctors themselves, no further action
has been taken.9 There seems little doubt that the Melbourne Seven will
continue, discreetly, to practice euthanasia.
The admissions made by these seven Australian doctors, while
premature in so far as they were intended to force either a "show-trial," or
3 Rodney Syme et al., An Open Letter to the State Premier of Victoria, (Mar. 24, 1995) (On file
with the PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.).
4 Rachel Buchanan, Charge Euthanasia Doctors, Says Right to Life, THE AGE (Melb.), Mar. 27,
1995, at l; Mark Forbes, Fury Over Assisted Deaths, THE SUNDAY AGE (Melb.), Mar. 26, 1995, at 3.
Shane Green, Kennett Rejects Euthanasia Inquiry, THE AGE (Melb.), April 4, 1995, at 5.
6 Rights of the Terminally IlI Act (1995) (Austrailia).
' Gay Alcorn, Kennett Flags Right-to-Die Bill, THE AGE (Melb.), May 26, 1995, at 1; Shane
Green & Steve Dow, Premier Signals State Euthanasia Debate, THE AGE (Melb.), May 27, 1995, at 3.
9 Steve Dow, No Euthanasia Change, Says Kennett, THE AGE (Melb.), Nov. 3, 1995, at 9; Terry
Brown, Euthanasia Appeal Rejected, THE HERALD-SUN (Melb.), Nov. 3, 1995, at 39.
9 Rachel Gibson, "Suicide" Doctors Face Probe, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 1, 1995, at 1; Rachel
Buchanan, Board Abandons Probe into Euthanasia Doctors, THE AGE (Melb.), June 21, 1995, at 3;
Rachel Buchanan, Police Probe on Euthanasia, THE AGE (Melb.), June 22, 1995, at 3; Rachel
Buchanan, Police Drop Euthanasia Inquiry, THE AGE (Melb.), Aug. 10, 1995, at 3.
JANUARY 1997
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
legislative reform, are typical of an increasing unwillingness amongst
sections of the medical profession to "play dumb" about their
involvement in euthanasia.' 0  Doctors such as Jack Kevorkian and
Timothy Quill in the United States, and Nigel Cox in England, have come
to represent a growing protest against the laws which prohibit assisted
suicide and euthanasia of the terminally ill. In the United States, much of
the focus has been on physician-assisted suicide ("PAS"). As understood
in this paper, PAS occurs when a doctor knowingly and intentionally gives
a patient the means, or otherwise assists a patient who takes his or her own
life. In Australia, the focus has largely been on active voluntary
euthanasia ("AVE"), intentionally and directly causing the death of a
terminally ill patient, in accordance with that patient's wishes, in order to
relieve the burden of disease or injury.
A. The Inevitability of PAS/A VE Reform
The current euthanasia debate did not arrive in a freak windstorm.
Instead, challenging society's traditional prohibition on the killing of
terminally ill, consenting patients is the logical next step in a legal and
ethical retreat from the sanctity of life ethic of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. This retreat is one of the large-scale changes evident within
western societies over the past few decades. When one looks to the law,
the intellectual history of that retreat is reflected in the changing definition
of death," in the growth of a legally-supported right to self-determination
extending to the withdrawal of life-support, 2 and in the recognition by
some courts that-in limited circumstances-life-support may be
withdrawn without consent because life is considered to be futile. 3 The
law, in turn, reflects broader changes in prevailing social philosophies that
have been greatly influenced by the technological revolution which has
occurred in medicine and by the promotion of debate through television
and the media. It is as a result of these developments that head-on
confrontation with the sanctity of life ethic is now possible in the late
twentieth century.
0 One of the seven doctors, respected urologist Rodney Syme, confirmed to newspaper
reporters a quiet history of euthanasia spanning over 20 years. Nick Davies, A Matter of Life & Death,
THE AGE (Melb.), Mar. 25, 1995, at I.
See discussion Infra part III(A)(I).
2 See discussion Infra Part Ill(A)(2); see, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990).
" See discussion Infra Part ill(A)(3); see, e.g., Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] App. Cas.
789.
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In view of the changing legal and moral foundations of society, it is
inevitable-whether in the short or medium term-that courts and
legislatures in western democracies will progressively legalize PAS/AVE.
Within a generation, the suggestion that a terminally ill patient should be
denied the right to die with medical assistance will appear primitive, if not
absurd. Former Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, Marshall Perron,
has compared the Northern Territory's euthanasia Act to legislation passed
in 1894 by the (former) British colony of South Australia, which became
the second jurisdiction in the world (after New Zealand) to give women
the right to vote, and the first to allow women to stand for Parliament.
In the United States, in March 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the prohibition on PAS infringed the "liberty" interest
enjoyed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 In
April 1996, the Second Circuit invalidated New York State's prohibition
on PAS on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.15 Although an adverse Supreme Court opinion
could potentially retard the process of pro-euthanasia law reform, this
would be a temporary delay only which could not survive generational
change. In the United States and beyond, the development of a legal right
to die with medical assistance, appears inevitable.
To some, the foregoing claims may appear audacious and even
dangerous. The aim of this paper is therefore to substantiate these claims
with reference to British Commonwealth and United States law, and to
place the legal issues within a wider social context. Part II of the paper
will consider the social context of the euthanasia debate, as it is evident
from media reports and the recent literature. It will identify the major
"players" in the euthanasia debate, some of the crucial issues in dispute,
and will review some recent euthanasia research in order to show just how
extensive is the fragmentation of opinion within the medical profession,
and how divisions over the euthanasia issue in turn reflect more
fundamental moral and philosophical viewpoints.
Part III of the paper will then turn to the law, arguing that the
current euthanasia debate is the culmination of a steady retreat from the
sanctity of life ethic evident in United States and British Commonwealth
caselaw and legislation. Increasingly, the social factors which have given
birth to right to die movements around the world, combined with the need
to fashion a logically sustainable jurisprudence, will lead to a legally
recognized right to die. Several models of legalized PAS/AVE have
emerged already, and these are reviewed.
'* Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
" Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Regardless of whether legalized PAS/AVE is considered good
social policy, an explicitly recognized right to PAS/AVE resolves, on a
doctrinal level, many of the legal dilemmas currently faced by doctors-it
allows them to kill. By contrast, in jurisdictions where such a right does
not exist, doctors remain squeezed between the competing demands of a
system which both respects and undermines the sanctity of life ethic; a
legal system that is, in the words of one of Britain's most senior judges,
"morally and intellectually misshapen." 16
II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE
A. Why Now?
In books and newspapers, on television and the internet, 7
euthanasia has become a familiar and constantly recurring subject of
community debate. But why now, after so many centuries of prohibition?
Prior to the enactment of the Northern Territory's euthanasia legislation,
Melbourne's Age newspaper carried an essay which suggested several
reasons:
The debate is about the limits of individual freedoms and the
political power of the Baby Boomers, now at the age when
they are beginning to contemplate their mortality. It's about
an aging population and a limited health dollar. It's about
an increasingly educated population losing its awe of the
medical profession. And it provides an intriguing look at
religion in a secular society. 18
All of these factors, and more, are involved. The concepts of
PAS/AVE are not new. Within the past two or three decades, however,
these ideas have had a significant persuasive effect on the public.
Politically active, right to die movements dedicated to PAS/AVE reform
have sprung up in many western countries. A necessary condition to
public support for PAS/AVE reform, and one which continues to fuel the
16 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 887.
17 For example, on-line sites such as Deathnet: <http://www.islandnet.com/-deathnett>, provide
on-line news reports, access to government reports, space for both advocates and opponents of
euthanasia to post materials, as well as links to other on-line resources, including the Canada-based
Last Rights Information Centre, and Derek Humphry's Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization
(ERGO).
" Gay Alcorn, Marshall Law, THE AGE (Melb.), May 24, 1995, at 13.
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euthanasia debate, is the emerging ethic of what might be called "liberal
individualism." 9 According to Somerville,
We are now societies based on intense individualism-
possibly individualism to the exclusion of any real sense of
community, including in situations facing death and
bereavement .... Matters such as euthanasia, that would
have been largely the subject of moral or religious discourse
are now explored in our courts and legislatures, particularly
through the concepts of individual human rights, civil rights
and constitutional rights. 20
Christian churches, particularly those with a more fundamentalist
theology, and those with a tradition of hierarchical religious authority,
such as the Roman Catholic church, are the mainstay of opposition to
euthanasia law reform. This is not surprising, since euthanasia, like
suicide, "represents a rejection of God's absolute sovereignty over life and
death."2 1 Furthermore, since churches preside over the rites of passage,
including death-to which special religious significance is attributed-
euthanasia also undermines church influence by undermining the church's
traditional moral domain. The decline of church influence in Australia has
weakened what might otherwise have been a far more impressive
impediment to PAS/AVE reform. Regardless of religious belief, however,
many opponents of euthanasia remain more communitarian in outlook,
believing that individual freedoms and interests should be tempered by
communal values, social goals and traditional constraints. 2  Euthanasia, in
contrast, is atomistic in its philosophy, an affirmation of individual moral
freedom in a world lacking moral absolutes.
The euthanasia debate takes place against a background of rapid
medical advancement. The drugs and machines of modem medicine can
keep the heart pumping and blood circulating far longer than nature could
unassisted. But such life, frequently lived without privacy within the
goldfish bowl of a hospital ward, comes at a cost. There are real concerns
within the community that human dignity will become a casualty of the
" Margaret Somerville, Sentencing Society to Ethical Death, THE AGE (Melb.), Nov. 13, 1995,
at 13.
20 Id.
2 Pope John Paul II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE
(1995), para 66. According to the Church, the height of arbitrariness and injustice is reached when
certain people, such as physicians or legislators, arrogate to themselves the power to decide who ought
to live and who ought to die. Id, para 67.
22 See Tom L. Beauchamp et al., Public & Private: Redrawing Boundaries, 24 HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT, May-June 1994, 18.
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goal of prolonging longevity. The euthanasia movement is also a protest
against medical bureaucracy and technological determinism. In the
Netherlands, the Remmelink Committee-appointed in 1990 to consider
options for euthanasia law reform and regulation-pointed to the
increasing importance of end of life decisions in an era when there are an
increasing number of cancer deaths, combined with a growth in the
number of life-prolonging technologies.23 Many of the factors mentioned
above are also evident with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndome,
("AIDS"). AIDS patients are burdened by drug therapy and a lingering
chronic phase.
Increasingly this century, and for the first time in human history, the
majority of people in western societies are dying from diseases which are
characterized by an extended deteriorative decline.24 The predictability of
this downhill road is having an important cultural effect, focusing attention
onto the manner of dying, and challenging assumptions about the norms of
dying.25 This is particularly true of AIDS, which shares the "deteriorative
decline," yet is unique amongst twentieth century illnesses in its capacity
to decimate young and healthy populations (mostly men) in a way not seen
since medicine arrested the typical killers of past centuries such as
typhoid, tuberculosis and smallpox. In this regard, AIDS challenges the
assumption of "medical control" over disease, and so undermines
traditional norms of medical management.
Not everyone accepts that euthanasia finds legitimacy as a reaction
against the impersonal, biology-driven achievements of modem medicine
nor the epidemiology of death in the twentieth century. Instead, some see
the push for euthanasia as a symptom of the failure of doctors to
communicate with their patients, their failure to respect patient choice, and
to discontinue treatment when it is futile, and their failure to practice good
palliative care.26 Others point to the aging population, and economic
pressures to free up hospital beds as reasons for the push for legalization. 7
23 Paul van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of
Life, 338 LANCET 669, 673 (1991).
" See Margaret P. Battin, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE, 201, 225 (1995).
25 See Id.
26 E.g., Brian Pollard & Ronald Winton, Why Doctors and Nurses Must Not Kill Patients, 158
MED. J. AUSTL. 426 (1993).
217 See B. A. Santamaria, Tacit Consent to Euthanasia, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 1-2, 1995,
at 28.
VOL. 6, No. I
EUTHANASIA JURISPRUDENCE
B. Players In The Euthanasia Debate
The euthanasia debate is not merely an academic squabble or
media-driven talkfest. Instead, it is a process of political struggle between
players with competing ideologies, and with far-reaching consequences. It
is a debate which is extremely relevant to us all, as death comes to us all.
The debate is reflected in media and community discussion. Not all
participants, however, have equal ability to make themselves heard, nor to
influence the processes required for social change. To appreciate the
complexity of the process of ideological struggle we are witnessing, it is
useful to consider each of the participants, as well as the major issues they
tend to focus upon.
1. The Wider Public
We have reached the point in Australia and the United States where
there is now broad community support for assisted suicide and/or
voluntary euthanasia legislation. A review of United States polls reveals
majority support for legalizing medically assisted death since 1973 (53%),
rising to 60% in 1977 and 63% in 1991.28 A 1996 Gallup poll reported
75% in favour of lawful, medically assisted death.29 In Australia, letters to
The Age newspaper, following the front page story of the Melbourne
Seven who admitted to performing euthanasia, were two to one in favour
of legalization.30 In July 1994, a Newspoll reported that four out of five
Australians supported pro-euthanasia law reform.3' A similar result was
obtained in a June 1995 AGB McNair AgePoll conducted in the wake of
the Northern Territory legislation.32  Morgan polls have shown steady
majority support for permitting doctors to give lethal drug doses to
terminally ill patients (78% support in June 1995).33
2S Harvard Program on Public Opinion and Health Care, Should Physicians Aid their Patients in
Dying? 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992).
29 Public Support Rising for Assisted Suicide, ERGO! U.S. NEWS BULLETINS, Apr. 15, 1996,
ERGO's NEWS ARCHIVES: <http://www.islandnet.com/--deathnet/ergo.html>.
10 Whose Life Is It?, THE AGE (Melb.), Mar. 31, 1995, at 15 (Editorial).
"' Steve Dow, Overwhelming Support for Pro-Euthanasia Law Reform, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN,
July 30-31, 1994, at 1.
32 Steve Dow & Elissa Blake, Most Back Euthanasia: Poll, THE AGE (Melb.), June 7, 1995, at I
(reporting 74% (male) and 76% (female) support for a law protecting doctors who perform euthanasia.
80% support was evident among twenty-five to thirty-nine year-olds, with 70% support amongst
people over fifty-five).
" Cf 77% support in July 1990, 76% support in March 1992: Australia 1995, Support for
Voluntary Euthanasia Stands at 78%, Last Rights Online Library,
<http://www.rights.org/-deathnet/Ir-library.html>; Australian polls found at:
<http://www.islandnet.com/-deathnet/Auspoll.html> (citing THE BULLETIN (Austl.) June 28, 1995).
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In Canada, a 1994 poll in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in
the Rodriguez case,34 found that 74% were in favour of PAS, although
support diminished marginally in the higher age categories (64% in those
51 and older).35 Significantly, Dutch public opinion, which rose sharply in
favour of voluntary euthanasia between 1966 and 1970, had only reached
57% support by 1991, with the highest levels of opposition in the sixty-
five to seventy age group. 36 Pro-euthanasia poll results have, inevitably,
been met with criticism that the wrong questions were asked.37 Sampling
errors are another unexplored issue.
There is a sizeable body of research looking at the factors which
mould individual attitudes toward active voluntary euthanasia (AVE).
Caddell and Newton's 1995 US study found conservative Protestants and
Catholics least supportive of active euthanasia, with higher levels of
support amongst liberal Protestants, Jews and those with no religious
affiliation (63% support overall). 38 Ho and Penney's 1992 Australian
study confirmed that highly religious people were less approving of
euthanasia than non-religious people. They argued, however, that this
correlation reflected underlying differences in level of conservatism and
that it was level of conservatism (rather than religiosity) which best
predicted pro-euthanasia attitudes. 39
These polls may, of course, give a flawed impression of the level of
support for PAS/AVE amongst patients themselves. Seale and Addington-
Hall's 1994 English study of the relatives of 3696 decedents reported that
"about a quarter of respondents who answered the question felt that it
would have been better if [the patient] had died earlier, and that a similar
proportion of the dying people were said to have felt this."4 ° 3.6% were
said to have asked for euthanasia. Pain was found to be a significant factor
", Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 107 D.L.R. 4th 342 (holding that the prohibition on
assisted suicide in British Columbia did not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
35 Public Opinion on the Right to Die and Doctor Assisted Suicides, Last Rights Online Library,
supra note 29; Canadian polls found at: <http://www.islandnet.coml-deathnet/Angus_Reid2.html>
(poll dating from Feb. 22-24, 1994).
36 Paul van der Maas et al., Changes in Dutch Opinions on Active Euthanasia, 1966 Through
1991, 273 JAMA 1411, 1412 (1995).
"' E.g., Warren K. Bartlett, Poll Push Shapes Assisted Death of an Ethical Debate, THE AGE
(Melb.), June 9, 1995 (letter); Jim Dominguez, Great Moral Issues Cannot be Resolved by Opinion
Polls, THE AGE (Melb.), June 16, 1995, at 13 (criticizing the AGM McNair poll, supra note 32). In
England, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society apparently claimed 791/6 support for voluntary euthanasia
on the basis of the question: "Would you like medical help to a peaceful death?" Their Lordships on
Euthanasia, 343 LANCET 430, 431 (1994).
3S David P. Caddell & Rae R. Newton, Euthanasia: American Attitudes Toward the Physician's
Role, 40 SOC. Sci. MED. 1671 (1995).
" Robert Ho & Ronald K. Penney, Euthanasia and Abortion: Personality Correlates for the
Decision to Terminate Life, 132 THE J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 77 (1992).
41 Clive Seale & Julia Addington-Hall, Euthanasia: Why People Want to Die Earlier, 39 Soc.
SCt. MED. 647, 648 (1994).
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in causing respondents to feel that an earlier death would have been
preferable in cancer deaths, but it was less important in non-cancer deaths.
In non-cancer deaths, dependency was a far more important factor than
pain in causing respondents to feel it would have been better for the
deceased to have died earlier. The factors reported as most important in
motivating a wish to die earlier amongst the decedents themselves related
to mental problems and dependency, and control issues were found to be
very significant in cases where there was a direct request for euthanasia.4
These results challenge the myth that unrelieved pain is the dominant
factor driving the euthanasia debate. While they direct attention to a
broader notion of palliative care, they also point to the underlying
existential and philosophical issues of personal autonomy and control.
2. The Medical Profession
a. The doctor as killer, martyr or celebrity
An important feature of the euthanasia debate is the massive media
attention given to those doctors who have achieved notoriety or celebrity
status either by openly admitting to PAS/AVE, or by being "found out"
and prosecuted for homicide. Such public prosecutions are not only a
recent phenomenon. In 1956, for example, Dr John Adams, an English
family practitioner, was tried at the Old Bailey for the murder of an eighty-
one year-old patient whom he had injected with 2.6 grams of heroin and
2.6 grams of morphine during the last days of her life.42 Although the
defendant was eventually acquitted,43 the Adams case is notable for Justice
Devlin's expression of the now well-established 44 principle of "double
41 Id at 649-51.
4' The patient, Mrs. Morrell, was an eighty-one year-old widow suffering the results of a stroke,
and from cerebral arterio-sclerosis (hardening of the arteries of the brain). Adams' case was not helped
by massive publicity which revealed that, at his encouragement, elderly patients had frequently left him
gifts, instead of paying his fees (which attracted heavy rates of tax). In fact, Mrs. Morrell had signed a
will leaving Dr. Adams a chest containing silver, and, if her son pre-deceased her, a Rolls-Royce.
Henry Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, CRIM. L. REV. 365, 367, 374 (1957). The silver and the
Rolls-Royce were, as it turned out, given to Dr. Adams after Mrs. Morrell's death, as an act of favour
by her son. In an earlier death the Coroner had investigated, Adams had received a £1000 cheque from
the deceased. Clifford Hawkins, MISHAP OR MALPRACTICE? 62 (1985).
" Dr. Adams was fined heavily, however, for a variety of offenses which included making false
statements (by claiming he was not a beneficiary under his patient's will), attempting to conceal phials
of morphine, and obstructing police. The General Medical Council later barred him from practicing
for 3 years. C. Hawkins, supra note 43, at 64-65. Devlin J., the presiding judge (later Lord Devlin),
wrote a book about the case after Adam's death. P. DEVLIN, EASING THE PASSING: THE TRIAL OF DR.
JOHN BODKIN ADAMS (Bodley Head, London, 1985).
" This principle has been accepted as part of the common law of the United Kingdom (Bland,
[1993] App. Cas. at 867); the United States (Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th
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effect," which provides that if the doctor's purpose in administering
potentially lethal drugs to a terminally ill patient is to relieve pain and
suffering, such treatment will be lawful, even if the incidental effect of the
drug dosages is to shorten life.45
More recent trials, however, have taken place against the backdrop
of already significant levels of public support for PAS/AVE legalization.
The doctor in his or her role as killer, martyr and celebrity has fanned the
flames of the debate and probably crystallised public support like no one
before. The media have brought the issue of euthanasia into the homes
and onto television screens, and people have made up their own minds.
On September 19, 1992, an eminent British consultant
rheumatologist, Dr. Nigel Cox, was found guilty of attempted murder.46
Cox injected potassium chloride into Mrs. Lillian Boyes, a seventy year-
old woman who had suffered acute rheumatoid arthritis for twenty years,
with serious complications.47 Boyes, who had been Cox's patient for
thirteen years, had "developed ulcers and abscesses on her arms and legs,
a rectal sore penetrating to the bone, fractured vertebrae, deformed -hands
and feet, swollen joints, and gangrene from steroid treatment. '4' Five
days before her death, Mrs. Boyes pleaded for an injection to end her life.
She was no longer absorbing diamorphine in doses of fifty milligrams an
hour and she "howled and screamed like a dog ' 49 when anyone touched
her.50 Two days before Mrs. Boyes' death, Dr. Cox wrote in his notes,
"[s]he still wants out and I don't think we can .reasonably disagree."'"
After attempting unsuccessfully to ease her pain With one hundred
milligrams diamorphine, he injected two ampoules of potassium chloride,
and recorded this in the notes.5 2 Mrs. Boyes died peacefully within a
minute or two of the injection. The cause of her death was recorded as
bronchopneumonia, and her body was cremated. 3
Cox was discovered when a Catholic nurse who was relieving on
the ward read the notes and reported the matter to hospital authorities, who
then informed police. In the absence of a body, and the risk in asking a
jury to convict for murder (which carries a mandatory life sentence in
Cir. 1996)); and New Zealand (Auckland Area Health Board v. Attorney-General, [1993] I N.Z.L.R.
235, 252 & 253).
4 Henry Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, CRIM. L. REV. 365, 375 (1957).
Clare Dyer, Rheumatologist Convicted of Attempted Murder, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 731 (1992).
47 id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
so Id.
"' Diana Brahams, Euthanasia: Doctor Convicted of Attempted Murder, 340 LANCET 782, 782
(1992).
52 Dyer, supra note 46, at 73 I.
s Brahams, supra note 51, at 782.
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Britain), Cox was charged with attempted murder. 4 As Sir Harry Ognall,
the presiding judge, later remarked, the principal strength of an English
jury is that it will frequently say "[t]o hell with the law-to convict this
person would not be fair."55  Nevertheless, Justice Ognall rejected the
argument that Cox's intention in injecting lethal quantities of a drug which
did not possess analgesic properties was to relieve pain, rather than to
kill. 6 A distressed and crying jury found Cox guilty, and Justice Ognall,
declaring that Cox had "betrayed his unequivocal duty as a physician,"
' 57
imposed a 12 month suspended prison sentence. 5  The General Medical
Council, "tempering justice with mercy," imposed no further penalty. 9
Unlike Dr. Adams in the 1950s, and the more recent case of Dr.
Arthur in 1981,6 o Dr. Cox was found guilty of a serious crime. In the
United States, the best-known advocates of PAS/AVE reform have (so far)
been more fortunate. In 1991, Timothy Quill, a forty-one year old intern
from Rochester, New York, published an account of PAS involvement in
the New England Journal of Medicine. Earlier, in 1989, Quill had been
one of twelve physicians who had written an article about the care of
hopelessly ill patients for the Journal, which stated that "all but two of us.
. .believe that it is not immoral for a physician to assist in the rational
suicide of a terminally ill person."
61
'4 Brahams, supra note 5i, at 782.
" The Honourable Mr. Justice Ognall, A Right to Die? Some Medico-Legal Reflections, 62
MEDIco- LEGAL J. 165, 168-69 (1994).
6 Id. at 170.
" The FinalAutonomy, 340 LANCET 757, 758 (1992) (editorial).
59 Id.
5 R.T. Shepherd, Untitled, 60 MEDICo-LEGAL J. 227, 229(1992).
0 Dr. Leonard Arthur, an experienced consultant pediatrician, was charged with the murder of a
Down Syndrome child rejected by its parents. This charge was later reduced to attempted murder. Dr.
Arthur had written, "Parents do not wish it [the baby] to survive. Nursing care only." The doctor
prescribed the drug dihydrocodeine (DF 118), a morphine-type drug, which alleviates stress. Diana
Brahams, Acquittal of Paediatrician Charged After Death of Infant with Down Syndrome, 2 LANCET
1101, 1101 (1981). The defense argued that Dr. Arthur's intention was to put the baby on a "holding
operation until a decision was made about his future or until something overtook the child which
caused death." Judge Tells Jury to Examine Baby Doctor's Intention, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 5,
1981, at 2. The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the child was doomed from the start, and
that Arthur took the view that a handicapped child rejected by its parents was better off dead. The
evidence showed, however, that the baby's health was such that it could have died at any moment; the
judge observing that "hope of infection was realized rather more swiftly than anyone may have
thought." The case arose because an unidentified informer reported Dr. Arthur to an organization
called "LIFE," which alleged to police that the child had been starved to death. Dr. Arthur died from a
brain tumor six months following his acquittal. Diana Brahams, Doctors in the Dock: the Last Sixty
Years, 60 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 227, 228 (1992). See also Women Cry 'Thank God' as Dr. Arthur is
Cleared, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 1981, at 2; Baby Had 80% Chance of Survival, Doctor Trial
Told, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 4, 1981, at 4.
6 Sydney H. Wanzer et. al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A
Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989).
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In his 1991 article, Quill detailed the case of Diane, a terminally ill
patient with leukemia who refused aggressive -treatment and asked for a
prescription of barbiturates to enable her to commit suicide, according to a
Hemlock Society recipe.62 Quill stated:
I wrote the prescription with an uneasy feeling about the
boundaries I was exploring-spiritual, legal, professional
and personal. Yet I also felt strongly that I was setting her
free to get the most out of the time she had left, and to
maintain dignity and control on her own terms until her
death.63
Quill ensured that Diane knew the quantities of drug required to
commit suicide, and met with her one final time before she took her life.6 4
When we met, it was clear that she knew what she was
doing, that she was sad and frightened to be leaving, but that
she would be even more terrified to stay and suffer. In our
tearful goodbye, she promised a reunion in the future at her
favorite spot on the edge of Lake Geneva, with dragons
swimming in the sunset.65
Two days later, having said goodbye to her husband and son, Diane
suicided.66 Quill certified the cause of death as acute leukemia "to protect
all of us, to protect Diane from an invasion into her past and her body, and
to continue to shield society from the knowledge of the degree of suffering
that people often undergo in the process of dying." 67
Following the publication of Quill's article on "Diane," the
Rochester District Attorney declined to prosecute Quill, noting that
prosecutors could not prove a crime without a body. An anonymous tip,
however, later revealed the true identity of "Diane." This enabled
investigators to trace her body to a Community College, where it had been
stored for dissection.6" Quill later appeared before a Grand Jury, which
62 Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualised Decision Making, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691, 693 (1991).
63 id.
64 Id.
65 d.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 694.
"' William Glaberson, Panel to Decide: Should Doctor Who Aided Suicide be Tried? N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1991, at B1.
VOL. 6, No. I
EUTHANASIA JURISPRUDENCE
refused to indict him.69 Assisted by the Seattle-based organization,
Compassion in Dying, Quill subsequently sought to overturn New York
State law prohibiting assisted suicide on the basis that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. While
unsuccessful in the lower courts,70 in April 1996, as noted above, the
Second Circuit upheld Quill's appeal.7 1
It is interesting to note that Quill, who supports the legalization of
assisted suicide, but not active euthanasia,72 published his account of
Diane's experience in order to present an alternative to Kevorkian-style
suicides.73 Quill has observed of Kevorkian that "[s]uicide is the sole
basis for the relationship he has with his patients, and that is
frightening. '74  As with other admissions of PAS/AVE in the medical
literature, 75 Quill's actions sparked a vigorous response. One well-known
opponent of PAS/AVE argued that legalized assisted suicide would
gradually lead doctors to progress from "awaiting the patient's decision
and readiness, to subtle elicitation of a request for death."76 Pellegrino
argues that "compassion is a virtue, not a principle," that "[c]ompassion,
too, must be subject to moral analysis ' 7  and that the moral psychology
69 Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al.
70 Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp 78, 84 (S.D. N.Y. 1994); See also Court Urged to End Ban On
Help With Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.'2, 1995, at A23.
7' Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
'3 Timothy E. Quill et. al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381 (1992).
" Glaberson,'supra note 68, at BI.
'4 Tom Morganthau et. al., Dr. Kevorkian's Death Wish, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1993, at 46-48,
(quoted in Greg Pence, Dr. Kevorkian and the Struggle for Physician-Assisted Dying, 9 BIOETHICS 62,
69 (1995)). Quill and others have published proposed criteria for physician-assisted suicide within the
wider context of compassionate palliative care. See Quill, supra note 72, at 1381-82. Quill has
encouraged doctors to explore the significance of patients' requests for assistance in dying, noting that
"[p]atients need our assurance that, if things get horrible, undignified or intolerable, we will not
abandon them, and we will continue to work with them to find acceptable solutions." Timothy E.
Quill, Doctor, I Want to Die. Will You Help Me? 270 JAMA 870, 873 (1993). See also TIMOTHY E.
QUILL, M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 155-75 (1993).
" See, e.g., It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988). This article provided a first-person
account of a gynecology resident rotating through a large private hospital, who was called out in the
middle of the night to attend a twenty-year old patient dying from ovarian cancer. The patient had
unrelenting vomiting caused by a sedating alcohol drip, her breathing was labored, and she had not
eaten or slept in two days. Id. "It was a gallows scene," the doctor wrote, "a cruel mockery of her
youth and unfulfilled potential. Her only words to me were "Let's get this over with." Id The
resident performed euthanasia on the patient, injecting 20mg of morphine sulfate. Id. Publication of
the article caused a storm of protest and debate. See, e.g., Letters, 259 JAMA 2094, 2094-98 (1988).
Also in response to the article, four medical ethicists wrote, "This is, by his own account, an impulsive
yet cold technician, arrogantly masquerading as a knight of compassion and humanity." Willard
Gaylin et. al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 2139, 2139 (1988).
76 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion Needs Reason Too, 270 JAMA 874-75 (1993).
77 Id.
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behind the act of killing does not justify the act.7" In contrast, other
bioethicists argue that "absolutist principles must always be chastened by
mercy.""
No discussion of PAS/AVE advocacy could be complete without
mentioning Jack Kevorkian, the Detroit-based, retired pathologist, who, on
September 7, 1996, assisted in his 40th suicide. 0 Although no stranger to
controversy on bioethics issues,8" Kevorkian's notoriety took a new turn
when on June 4,1990, he drove Janet Adkins, a fifty-four year-old mother
of three with recently diagnosed Alzheimer's disease, to a suburban
campsite where she committed suicide in the back of Kevorkian's rusty
Volkswagen van, using his widely-publicized "suicide machine" to
release a lethal cocktail of drugs into her bloodstream. 2 Prior to this,
Kevorkian had scouted southeastern Michigan in vain for a clinic, church
or funeral home which would allow him to supervise suicides on its
premises.8 3 The Adkins suicide troubled Hemlock Society founder Derek
Humphry, who stated, "[iut's not death with dignity to have to travel 2,000
miles from home and die in the back of a camper."18 4
Although Kevorkian was charged with first degree murder
following Adkin's death, the charge was dismissed because Michigan did
not have, at the time, any law prohibiting assisted suicide8 5 Effective on
February 25, 1993, however, Michigan enacted legislation which made it a
felony to assist in suicide, with a penalty of up to four years in prison. The
legislation was temporary, while a state-appointed Commission studied the
issue.
On August 4, 1993, Kevorkian attended his seventeenth assisted
suicide, the first after the new law. According to evidence which emerged
at trial, Kevorkian picked up Thomas Hyde, a thirty year-old landscaper
with Lou Gehrig's disease, drove him into a parking space behind
Kevorkian's apartment, and fixed a mask over his face. Although Lou
I d. at 875.
7' Kenneth L. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death, 259 JAMA 2140,
2141 (1988).
SO Kevorkian Assists Isabel Correa, ERGO! NEWS BULLETINS (Sept. 7, 1996)
<http://www.islandnet.com/deathnet/ergo_news 14.html>.
" See Ivar Peterson, In One Doctor's Way of Life, a Way of Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995,
at A 14 (profile of Kevorkian).
2 Timothy Egan, As Memory and Music Faded, Oregon Woman Chose Death, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1990, at A I; Melinda Beck et. al., The Doctor's Suicide Van, BULLETIN (Austl.), June 19,
1990, at 80.
" Isabel Wilkerson, Physician Fulfills a Goal: Aiding a Person in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1990, at D22.
Melinda Beck et. al., The Doctor's Suicide Van, BULLETIN (Austl.), June 19, 1990, at 81.
's Michigan Court Bars Doctor From Using His Suicide Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at
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Gehrig's disease causes the eventual loss of all motor function, Hyde
could still move his left hand, which he used to remove a clip, thus starting
the flow of carbon monoxide gas.86 Kevorkian began using carbon
monoxide poisoning as a method of achieving suicide after his licence to
practice medicine in Michigan was revoked in 1991, thus making it
impossible to buy or prescribe the drugs needed for his "suicide
machine."
Kevorkian was charged under the new Michigan law for assisting
suicide. While on bail, however, he assisted in three more suicides,
vowing to go on a hunger strike if jailed.87 Kevorkian was jailed on
November 30, after refusing to post $50,000 bond for charges stemming
from suicide nineteen, involving a seventy-two year-old woman with Lou
Gehrig's disease.88 Kevorkian began a hunger strike which continued for
over two weeks, and only ended after his bond was reduced to $100 and
paid by a supporter.89
In January 1994, a county circuit court declared Michigan's anti-
assisted suicide law unconstitutional. All outstanding charges against
Kervorkian were dismissed, with the exception of those relating to Thomas
Hyde.90 At the trial in April 1994, Kevorkian admitted knowledge of the
Michigan law which made assisted suicide a felony, but relied upon an
exception in the statute, which exempted procedures which hasten or
increase the risk of death, where the intent is to "relieve pain and
discomfort and not to cause death." After nine hours of deliberations, the
Detroit jury of nine women and three men acquitted Kevorkian, citing
uncertainties over his motive, the wisdom of the Michigan law, and the
place of death. 9'
Following the Hyde case came an unsuccessful Kevorkian-
sponsored drive to raise the 256,000 signatures needed to qualify for a
citizen-initiated referendum on assisted suicide in Michigan.92 In late
November 1994, Kervorkian performed his twenty-first case of
"medicide," his first since the Hyde trial. Kevorkian's assistance to
Margaret Garrish, a seventy-two year-old Detroit housewife whose
' Don Terry, Kevorkian Assists in Death of His 17th Suicide Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993,
at A14.
'T Kevorkian Apartment Used in Suicide, NEWSDAY, Nov. 23, 1993, at 18.
" Mixed Kevorkian Rulings, NEWSDAY, Dec., 15, 1993, at 17.
9 David Lowder, Kevorkian Free. Vows No Deaths, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 18, 1993, at 9.
'o Aided-Suicide Law Invalidated Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at A 17; Trial is Orderedfor
Suicide Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at A9.
9' David Margdick, Jury Acquits Dr. Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1994, at A 1; Julia Prodis, Special State Law Fails to Stop "Dr Death," AUSTRALIAN, May 4, 1994,
at 16.
92 Kevorkian's Ballot Drive on Suicide Aid Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A14.
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ailments included rheumatoid arthritis, advanced osteoporosis and severe
colon disorders, came just hours after the expiration of the Michigan anti-
suicide law, which had a sunset clause.
By late 1994, state appeals over the issue of whether the (now
expired) Michigan law against assisted suicide infringed the United States
Constitution finally reached the Michigan Supreme Court. The court held
that the law did not infringe the Constitution. Importantly, however, the
Michigan Court also stated that assisted suicide could be prosecuted in the
absence of a statute, as a common law felony.93
Undeterred by the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to
review the Michigan Supreme Court decision, Kevorkian assisted his
twenty-second and twenty-third suicides in May 1995, exposing himself to
felony charges under common law.94  Number twenty-three, Nicholas
Loving, a twenty-seven year-old college student from Arizona suffering
from Lou Gehrig's disease, died in a "sanctuary house" in suburban
Detroit. His body was later left in the parking lot of the County Medical
Examiner.95 Number twenty-four, a Kansas woman with Lou Gehrig's
disease, died in an abandoned building which Kevorkian briefly rented and
called a "mercy clinic." 96  His Volkswagen impounded, Kevorkian's
twenty-fifth patient was left under a sheet in the back seat of an old
Renault purchased by Kevorkian. The Renault was parked outside the
emergency department of a large hospital.97
On March 8, 1996, after deliberating for two days, Kevorkian was
acquitted for a second time by a jury in Pontiac, Michigan, for assisting the
self-administration of carbon monoxide in suicides nineteen and twenty. 9
Subsequently, protesting a decision to charge him under Michigan
common law for suicides two and three in 1991, Kevorkian donned a
white wig, tricomer hat, blue britches, gold brocade coat and buckle shoes,
saying "[ilt's silly to have modem dress when you're dealing with ancient
jurisprudence." 99 On May 14, 1996, Kevorkian was acquitted in relation
" The Michigan legislature has since been unable to resolve political differences and to capitalize
on this ruling by enacting a new anti-suicide law. Kevorkian Vows to Keep Fighting Laws Barring
Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 18, 1994, at A43.
"4 James Bennet, Dr Kevorkian Assists at His 22nd Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A20;
Kevorkian Once Again Aids Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at A6.
9 Woman Dies at Kevorkian Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A 12.
Scoffing at questions, Fieger, Kevorkian's lawyer, told reporters, "I know of no zoning
regulations against the prevention of suffering." Id.
97 In Assisted Suicide, Body Is Left Near Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at A13.
" These suicides, performed in 1993, followed the Hyde case, and came after the Michigan felony
suicide law was enacted Kevorkian Acquitted of All Charges, ERGO! NEWS BULLETINS, I (Mar. 8,
1996) <http://www.islandnet.com/deathnet/ergonews8.html>,
99 Kevorkian: Trial or Witch-Hunt? ERGO! NEWS BULLETINS, 2 (Apr. 2, 1996)
<http://www.islandnet.com/deathnettergo news9.html>.
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to these charges by a jury of six men and six women, having assisted in his
twenty-eighth suicide between sessions in the witness stand.' 0 As the
verdict was announced, Kervorkian's lawyer leaned across the table to the
prosecutor and proclaimed "You're out of a job."'' On May 6, 1996,
Kevorkian assisted the death of Canadian PAS advocate Austin Bastable,
who suffered from chronic progressive multiple sclerosis. After his death,
Bastable's body was whisked back across the border to Windsor,
Ontario.
0 2
Kevorkian's crusade shows little signs of slowing. On August 23,
1996, for example, Kevorkian assisted in his third and fourth suicides for
the week. The suicides were about nine hours apart. After dropping off a
corpse at a local hospital, Kevorkian was stopped by police, and was
arrested after calling them Nazis. On September 7, 1996, he assisted in his
fourtieth suicide, hours after police raided the motel where he was
providing counseling. 0 3  More recently, however, the Supreme Court
refused to hear an appeal from a Michigan court which had issued an
injunction against Kevorkian from using his "suicide machine," or any
other means, to end human life.'
0 4
More than anyone else, Kevorkian has brought medically-assisted
suicide into the American public arena. According to his friend, Dr.
Stanley Levy, "[h]e is the only one to do it, because the medical
profession won't. The profession's response is the hospice system. It says
'[y]ou can die, but you have to take your time doing it."" 0 5 While the
legal repercussions of Kevorkian's actions are still continuing, an eventual
conviction is far from certain.0 6 Opinion polls still favour Kevorkian,
who says bluntly, "[i]t's all a farce, and I don't care for these legal games.
This is not illegal, no matter what they say, and the common people know
it and support me."' 
07
While the Kevorkian crusade is unusual for its intensity and legal
maneuvers, it is important to stress that the wider euthanasia debate is not
a local or an isolated phenomenon. The debate sparked in Australia by the
"Melbourne Seven," in the United States by Quill and Kevorkian, in
100 Kevorkian Acquitted-For the Third Time, ERGO! NEWS BULLETINS, 6 (May 14, 1996)
<http://www.islandnet.com/deathnet/ergo news 10.html>.
01 Id.
102 Toronto: Austin Bastable Dies with the Aid of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, LAST RIGHTS' NEWS
BULLETINS (May 6, 1996) <http://www.rights.org/-deathnet/last rights.html>.
103 Kevorkian Assists Isabel Correa, supra note 80.
104 Judges Switch Off Dr. Death's Apparatus, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 17, 1996, at 9.
'05 Peterson, supra note 81, at A 14.
106 Doctor Seeks to Quash Case of Murder in Suicide Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at
A 12.
107 Id.
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England by Cox, and in Canada by the Rodriguez case, °8 is the same
debate. In each of these countries, the social and jurisprudential debate
shares common features. Doctors involved in PAS/AVE are no longer the
grotesque embodiments of the freakish fringe. On the contrary, they have
been able to confidently confront the traditional Hippocratic injunction
against killing while achieving a large measure of public support.
Moreover, their ability to largely escape the legal consequences of their
actions points to profound changes both within the medical profession, and
society generally.
b. The fragmentation of medical opinion over PAS/A VE
Quill, Kevorkian and colleagues are the tip of the iceberg; they are
spokespersons for the substantial segment of the medical profession that
now favors PAS/AVE reform. Nevertheless, this shift in medical opinion
is yet to be reflected in the expressed views of professional bodies such as
the Australian and American Medical Associations. The participation of
these bodies is critical to the process of national law reform, in view of the
ownership and control that such bodies seek to exercise over questions of
health policy and ethics.
A review of recent studies bears out the fragmentation of medical
practitioners' attitudes towards PAS/AVE reform. Lee et al, in a 1996
study of 2761 Oregon doctors, reported that 66% regarded physician-
assisted suicide (PAS) as ethical in some cases, and 60% supported
legalization in some cases. Forty-six percent indicated they might be
willing to prescribe a lethal drug dose for a terminally ill patient if this was
legal, although 52% had moral objections. Twenty-one percent (570
log National debate over PAS/AVE in Canada was sparked by the case of Sue Rodriguez, a 43-
year old secretary from Victoria, British Columbia, who died with the assistance of an unknown doctor
on 12 February 1994. Rodriguez began widely publicized legal proceedings, claiming that the
prohibition of assisted suicide violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian
Bill of Rights). Although narrowly unsuccessful (five-to-four) in the Canadian Supreme Court(Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342), Rodriguez met federal MP Svend
Robinson during her campaign, who held Rodriguez in his arms as she died peacefully, assisted by a
doctor whom he refused to name. Keith Baldrey & Peter O'Neill, MP Refuses to Name Doctor Who
Helped in Suicide Death, VANC. SUN, Feb. 15, 1994, at Al, B6. In a videotaped appeal to the
Commons Standing Committee on Justice in Ottawa in 1992, Rodriguez had argued, "If I cannot give
consent to my own death, then whose body is this? Who owns my life?" Robert Mason Lee, Tributes
Pour in as Brave Struggle Finally Ends for Sue Rodriguez: Assisted Suicide Ends Life of Woman Who
Galvanized Nation, VANC. SUN, Feb. 14, 1994, at A3. Following her suicide, a special prosecutor held
that there was insufficient evidence to press charges against Robinson. Justine Hunter, Charges Ruled
Out Against MP, VANC. SUN, June 29, 1995, at BI. The identity of the doctor involved has never been
revealed. For further discussion of euthanasia in the Canadian context, see Russel Ogden, The Right to
Die: A Policy Proposal for Euthanasia and Aid in Dying, 20 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994).
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doctors) had been asked by a patient for a prescription for a lethal dose and
7% had complied.'0 9
These levels of support are consistent with a 1996 study by
Bachman et al. of 1,119 Michigan physicians." 0 Fifty-six percent of
physicians preferred the legalization of PAS to an explicit ban (37%
opposed), although given a wider range of choices, 40% preferred
legalization, 37% preferred no government regulation, and 17% preferred
prohibition. Thirty-five percent thought they might participate in PAS if it
were legal, and 22% in active voluntary euthanasia."'
Similar results emerge from studies carried out within medical
specialties. A 1995 study of Michigan oncologists reported 18% and 4%
participation in assisted suicide and active euthanasia, respectively, against
a background of 21% in favor of 44% unsure of and 35% in opposition to
hypothetical legislation legalizing assisted suicide. 12 Levels of support
amongst anesthesiologists are considerably higher.' A 1992 study of San
Francisco physicians specializing in AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV"), reported that almost a quarter of respondents would be
prepared to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to a competent terminally
ill patient with AIDS." 4 Interestingly, a 1995 survey of members of the
Australian Society for HIV Medicine reported that nearly one in five
doctors had helped an HIV patient to die, responding to 52% of patient
requests for assistance."'
The American experience discussed above is not unique. Ward and
Tate in a 1994 English study of 312 doctors reported that 124 of 273
doctors answering the question had been requested by a patient to hasten
death; 12% of respondents complied." 6 Forty-six percent indicated they
would consider taking active steps to achieve a patient's death if it were
legal.
109 Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 310 (1996).
110 Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward
Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303 (1996).
Ill Id.
112 David J Doukas et al., Attitudes and Behaviours on Physician-Assisted Death: A Study of
Michigan Oncologists, 13 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1055, 1057-58 (1995).
113 D. M. Rothernberg & R. J. McCarthy, Anesthesiologists' Perspectives on Physician-
Assisted Death: A Survey of Anesthesiologists in the United States, 77 ANESTHESIOLOGY A1082
(1992).
114 Lee Slome et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide in AIDS, 5 J. ACQ. IMM.
DEF. SYND. 712 (1992).
[i Justine Ferrari, Doctors Help in HIV Patients'Suicides, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 17, 1995, at 3.
!16 B.J. Ward & P. A. Tate, Attitudes Among NHS Doctors to Requests for Euthanasia, 308
BRIT. MED. J. 1332 (1994).
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In Australia, Baume and O'Malley's 1994 study of 1268 doctors in
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory reported that 46%
of respondents had been asked by a patient to hasten his or her death, 28%
of whom had complied with the request (12.3% of all respondents).
Eighty percent of the doctors who had performed euthanasia had done so
more than once. Fifty-nine percent agreed in principle that active
euthanasia is sometimes right, and 58% called for legal change." 7 Data
from other select Australian studies are summarized in Table 1.11" In each
of these studies, an overwhelming majority of doctors who admitted to
having performed active euthanasia upon a patient were confident that
they had done the right thing." 9  The role of nurses in performing
euthanasia has been largely ignored in the debate. While not reviewed
here, studies show significant levels of involvement. 2 '
117 Peter Baume & Emma O'Malley, Euthanasia: Attitudes and Practices of Medical
Practitioners, 161 MED. J. AUSTL. 137, 144 (1994).
,IS Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary
Euthanasia, 148 MED. J. AUSTL. 623 (1988); Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Euthanasia: A Survey of
Nurses 'Attitudes and Practices, 21 AUSTL. NURSES J. 21 (1992); Christine A. Stevens & Riaz Hassan,
Management of Death, Dying and Euthanasia: Attitudes and Practices of Medical Practitioners in
South Australia, 20 J. MED. ETHICS 41, 43 (1994).
19 Stevens & Hassan reported, however, that 13% of sixty-seven doctors who had performed
active euthanasia considered that they had not done the right thing, and 18% did not think such action
was ever "right." Christine A. Stevens & Riaz Hassan, Management of Death, Dying and Euthanasia:
Attitudes and Practices of Medical Practitioners in South Australia, 20 J. MED. ETHICS 41, 43 (1994).
120 See David A. Asch, The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide,
334 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1374 (1996) (reviewing a number of studies, and reporting on a survey of
1600 nurses, 1139 of whom responded and 852 of whom indicated they practiced exclusively in
critical care units. Of the 852, 141 (17%) had received requests for assisted suicide or euthanasia, 129
(16%) had engaged in such practices, and an additional 4% hastened patients' deaths by only
pretending to provide physician-ordered life-support).
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Table I
Health Care Workers' Attitudes to Active Voluntary Euthanasia: Australian Studies
Study In-principle Compliance Law Reform
Support with Patient
Requests
Kuhse & Singer: 869 It is sometimes right for a *40% of doctors (354) 60% to 37% in favor of
Victorian doctors (1988) doctor to take active steps asked by patient to hasten pro-euthanasia law reform
to end a patient's life at death;
*Sample: 1893 (46% the patient's request: 62% *29% (107) of 369
to 34% in favour doctors had taken active
response rate) steps to end a patient's
life
Kuhse & Singer: 951 75% to 25% support in *55% of nurses (502) 78% of respondents in
Victorian nurses (1992) favour of Australia asked by patient to hasten favor of pro-euthanasia
adopting the Netherlands death, 333 nurses law reform
*Sample: 1942 (49% situation permitting active received requests for
response rate) voluntary euthanasia in direct assistance;
certain circumstances *5% (of333) took active
steps to hasten death
without a doctor's
request; 25% (of 502)
were requested by a
doctor to take active
measures to end a
patient's life and 85% of
this number complied
Stevens & Hassan: 298 Is it ever right to bring *33% of doctors asked by 45% in favor of
South Australian doctors about the death of a patient to hasten death by legalization of active
(1994) patient by active steps? taking active steps; 19% euthanasia (39% opposed)
18% said yes, 26% said (56) had complied with
*Sample: 494 (60% yes, but only if requested the request
usable returns) by the patient
Baume & O'Malley: 59% agreement that it is *46.4% of doctors asked 58% in favor of changing
1268 New South Wales sometimes right for a by patient to hasten death; the law to permit active
and ACT doctors (1994) doctor to take active steps of those asked, 28% had voluntary euthanasia
to bring about a patient's complied with the request
*Sample: 1667 (76% death (12.3% overall); 7% had
response rate) provided the means for
suicide
c. Issues in the medical debate
While levels of support for PAS/AVE reform within the medical
profession probably do not approach levels of support within the
community generally, such support does appear to have reached the
critical mass where it can now be said (at least in some States) that a
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majority of the medical profession supports reform. 121  The current
conservatism of bodies such as the Australian Medical Association
("AMA") is obscuring this fact, while also providing a convenient shield
for politicians reluctant to handle a "hot potato." In Australia, for
example, the opposition of the Victorian Branch of the AMA is well
known, and the Victorian Premier has indicated that he will not consider
euthanasia law reform until the medical community shows overwhelming
support for it.' 22 Since the process of legalized euthanasia requires doctors
to play a central role, legislation introduced over the protest of significant
sections of the medical profession could hardly command public
confidence. This may explain the reluctance of bodies such as the
Victorian Branch of the AMA to survey its own membership. 123 A pro-
euthanasia result could only fuel the reform process.
Part of the opposition to pro-euthanasia law reform is the perception
that palliative care can adequately relieve pain and distress, thereby
obviating the need for a "euthanasia escape route."' 24 Conversely, there is
also the concern that legalized euthanasia would enable doctors
inexperienced in palliative care to "legally eliminate the problem by
eliminating the patient."' 125  Baume and O'Malley, reflecting on the
implications of their survey study, 126 conclude that the levels of
participation in illegal euthanasia suggest "a substantial level of need
among patients for symptom relief which current arrangements do not
provide."' 27  Palliative care physicians, however, appear generally
opposed to euthanasia. A prominent Australian specialist has noted that
"good pain control can be achieved, employing standard techniques as
well as input from the multidisciplinary team, for more than 90% of
patients with advanced cancer." I2"
One Australian palliative care specialist who has broken ranks is
Adelaide hospice physician Roger Hunt, who replies:
But what can be done for those patients who have
unresolvable pain? And what about common problems such
121 See Baume & O'Malley, supra note 117. See also Doctors in Death's Shadow,
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 9, 1997, at 13.
122 Telephone Interview with the Honourable Jeffrey Kennett (Apr. 8, 1995).
123 Rachel Gibson, Australia: Euthanasia Survey Idea Rejected, THE AGE (Melb.), Mar. 31,
1995, at 5.
t2 Id.
125 Brian J. Pollard, 161 MED. J. AUSTL. 572 (1994) (letter).
126 Baume & O'Malley, supra note 117, and accompanying text.
127 Baume & O'Malley, supra note 117, at 142.
128 Roger Woodruff, Facts Needed to Balance Doctors' Euthanasia Push, THE AGE (Melb.),
Mar. 30, 1995, at 12.
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as weakness, loss of independence, incontinence, loss of
dignity and a sense of meaninglessness due to a
progressively diminishing quality of life? Such problems
cannot be eliminated by palliative care teams. 2 9
Conceding that palliative care has its limitations, other specialists
point to "inevitable, uncontrollable and probably undetectable abuse,"' 3 °
that would follow legalized euthanasia, adding that "[k]illing the failures
of medical or social care would be negative, in that it would not contribute
to finding solutions to their problems."'' On this view, re-defining the
doctor's role to include killing, in addition to the established functions of
healing and comforting, will eventually undermine medical skills, and
retard medical progress.
Closely associated with this concern is the fear that legalized
euthanasia will lead to a devaluation of palliative care, including
inadequate development and funding of palliative care services. Many
would be alarmed at the statement contained in the Court opinion in the
Compassion in Dying case; that "we are reluctant to say that, in a society
in which the costs of protracted health care can be so exorbitant, it is
improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the economic welfare
of their families and loved ones into consideration. "32 Nevertheless, the
resources to eradicate completely any economic incentive for euthanasia
are as remote as ever, particularly in the United States, which lacks a
comprehensive, publicly funded, health insurance system.
It is important to distinguish between the issue of economics and
medical resources, and the related (although understated) issue of the
regulation of medical practice. Euthanasia is already practiced by a
substantial number of doctors, many of whom are nevertheless opposed to
legalization.' One critic, for example, asserts that "[t]he Australian
Medical Association doesn't like euthanasia because it might lead to
increased State regulation of their highly individualistic profession."1
34
129 Roger Hunt, Legislative Reform is Needed, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 7, 1995, at 16.
30 Pollard & Winton, supra note 26, at 427.
13 Pollard & Winton, supra note 26, at 428.
32 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
1 Data emerging from an Australia/Californian qualitative study of PAS/AVE within the HIV
community coordinated by the writer confirms the "network" or "underground" in PAS/AVE services.
This study, to be published by Melbourne University Press, is due to appear in late 1997.
131 Beatrice Faust, Give Patients Free Will Over Life and Death, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, June
10-11, 1995, at 26.
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3. The Right to Die Societies
"Right-to-Die" societies and civil liberties groups are at the
forefront of the euthanasia debate, campaigning vigorously, funding
research, 35 funding and bringing lawsuits, 136 in an effort to influence the
other players in the debate. While opponents dislike their methods, 137 they
are probably no different from other political lobbying groups.
An interesting 1993 study of the attitudes of members of the
Hemlock Society, and the California Pro-Life Council ("CPLC"),
confirmed that "[c]hristian religious training most influenced opposition
to euthanasia, whereas death-proximate experiences most influenced
approval of euthanasia." '13 8 Similarly, "[t]he largest proportion of the
CPLC members identified themselves as Catholic and as believers in a
consequential afterlife, whereas the largest proportion of Hemlock
respondents described themselves as atheist/agnostic and as not believing
in an afterlife." 3 9 Broadly speaking, euthanasia societies can be seen as in
the vanguard of a new, more secular and individualistic world view,
promoting social policies that are ideologically opposed to the more
communitarian ethos embodied in the attitude of the Catholic church.
4. The Churches
Religion makes sparks fly in the euthanasia debate. Churches are
seen, and see themselves, as major players in issues involving morals and
ethics. Anderson and Caddell claim that religious opposition to
euthanasia, particularly from conservative churches within the Judeo-
Christian tradition, focuses around three ideas: resistance to playing God,
the moral injunction "Thou Shalt Not Kill," and the potential spiritual
benefits of suffering. 40  The opposition of the Catholic church, in
particular, is widely known. In 1980, the Vatican confirmed that "nothing
and no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human being,
135 See, e.g., Baume & O'Malley, supra note 117.
136 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 826.
137 See, e.g., B.A. Santamaria, A Prayer for the Dying, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, June 3-4, 1995,
at 24. 13 J. Holden, Demographics, Attitudes, and Afterlife Beliefs of Right-To-Life and Right-To-
Die Organization Members, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 521, 525 (1993).
139 Id. at 526.
140 James G. Anderson & David P. Caddell, Attitudes of Medical Professionals Toward
Euthanasia, 37 SOC. Sc. & MED. 105, 106 (1993).
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whether a foetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person or one
suffering from an incurable disease, or a person who is dying." 14'
a. Religion and euthanasia attitudes
Studies demonstrate a correlation between "depth of religious
commitment" and attitudes towards euthanasia. Caddell and Newton,
reviewing the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center upon 8,384 American respondents from 1977 to 1988,
conclude that acceptance of PAS/AVE "decreased as religious self-
perception increased, with those perceiving themselves as having strong
religious attachments being the least likely to accept active euthanasia
(47.1%) and suicide (27.4%)." 142 In Australia, however, as noted
previously, religiosity does not appear to determine euthanasia attitudes
independent of level of conservatism.'43 This is an interesting finding,
since Australian culture (perhaps a remnant of convict, rather than puritan
origins) is more secular than America culture, with fewer Australians
having religious affiliations or attending church.
The world view which underlies a religious commitment also bears
some relationship with euthanasia attitudes. Caddell and Newton's data
confirmed their hypothesis that the focus on "this world," and the
perceived importance of social action preventing present human suffering
in liberal Protestant thought, would correlate with a greater acceptance of
PAS/AVE. In contrast, the focus on moral absolutes and the afterlife in
conservative Protestant teaching was found to correlate with the least
acceptance to PAS/AVE of any religious group, including Catholics.
44
In Australia, the Anglican and Catholic churches, Judaism and
Islam, although not yet the Uniting Church, "disapprove of active
voluntary euthanasia and have teachings specifically opposed to
euthanasia and to suicide."'' 45  Nevertheless, Kuhse and Singer's 1988
study of doctors in the Australian State of Victoria found that of the 62%
of respondents supporting, in principle, active voluntary euthanasia,
141 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, DECLARATION ON EUTHANAISA 7
(Vatican City, 1980), referenced from H. Kuhse, Sanctity of Life, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Dutch
Experience: Some Implications for Public Policy, forthcoming in K. Bayertz (ed.) SANCTITY OF LIFE &
DIGNITY IN MEDICINE.
142 David P. Caddell & Rae R. Newton, Euthanasia: American Attitudes Toward the
Physician's Role, 40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1671, 1677 (1995).
143 Ho & Penney, supra note 39.
I" Caddell & Newton, supra note 142, at 1673, 1676.
145 Peter Baume et al., Professed Religious Affiliation and the Practice of Euthanasia, 21 J.
MED. ETHICS 49 (1995).
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Roman Catholics were the only group not to give majority support.'46
Baume and O'Malley's 1994 replication of this study in New South Wales
found Catholic practitioners most opposed to PAS/AVE, agnostic/atheist
practitioners most sympathetic, and Protestant practitioners midway
between. 47 Interestingly, "non-theists" were more than twice as likely to
know of other doctors who practised AVE, and were more than three times
more likely to think AVE to be sometimes right, compared to theist
practitioners." 1
48
While Catholic practitioners were significantly different from others
in the strength of their opposition to euthanasia, Baume and O'Malley did
find a small minority of Catholic doctors prepared to perform AVE (18%
of those asked by patients to hasten death). 49 Majority support amongst
Catholics in the community for legalized euthanasia further supports the
disjunction between official Church teaching and lay views, 50 and may
also underscore the creeping influence of the liberal individualist ethic
which is central to PAS/AVE reform.
b. Religion, euthanasia and the media
The clash between the received wisdom of hierarchal religions, and
the individualistic ethic of secular liberals, has sparked some passionate
exchanges in the media.' 5' In Australia, Melbourne's Catholic Archbishop
recently expressed his Church's view, as follows:
The word euthanasia should be kept for what it correctly
defines, the deliberate killing of another. Euthanasia is
simply another name for the crime of homicide. In Victoria,
those who commit this crime are subject to the law of the
land (and of their conscience). We should not authorize any
group to commit homicide on the dying.'52
He continued,
146 Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary
Euthanasia, 148 MED. J. AUSTL. 623, 625 (1988).
147 Baume et al., supra note 145, at 50.
14' Baume et al., supra note 145, at 50.
149 Baume et al., supra note 145, at 52.
1S0 Baume et al., supra note 145, at 53.
15 Frank Little, There is Nothing Compassionate in a Doctor's "Mercy" Killing, THE AGE
(Melb.), Apr. 17, 1995, at 9
152 Id.
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Does our society want the healing profession to become a
killing profession?... To kill a dying patient is the ultimate
abandonment, an irrevocable statement that you will not
share their passion any longer, that you are not
compassionate .... I believe our humanity will be seriously
eroded if our response to weakness, suffering and the
process of dying is euthanasia, that other name for the crime
of homicide."'
Urologist Mr. Rodney Syme, President of the Voluntary Euthanasia
Society of Victoria, and one of the "Melbourne Seven," responded in
terms which demonstrate the wider ideological conflict, and bitterness
toward traditional religious morality,
The Catholic Church has an impressive history of
reactionary behaviour, clinging to ideas pertaining to a
society of 2000 or more years ago. Its rigidity and
dependence on authority makes it unable to lead in
important social issues. Last century it opposed cremation as
a pagan practice, and opposed anaesthesia in childbirth,
believing it was women's lot to suffer in this process. In
this century, it has opposed artificial contraception despite
the world's population growth threatening its very existence,
and particularly in those Third World countries where the
church has great influence. It fails to recognize the justice
of women's claims to a true place in its church, based as it is
on authority derived from a different time.
He concluded:
The Catholic Church argues much about intent-the intent
of the doctor-but ignores the consent of the patient and the
motive of the doctor. The primary intention of a doctor in
assisting suicide for terminal suffering is to relieve that pain
and suffering, but also recognizes that in certain
circumstances, this can only finally occur by death. The
doctor's motive is pure, based on compassion not, as in
homicide, on greed or hate or revenge.
5 4
153 Id.
"s4 Steve Dow, Assisted Suicide is not a Synonym for Homicide, THE AGE (Melb.), May 17,
1995, at 15; see also Putting Faith in Euthanasia, THE AGE (Melb.), June 7, 1995, at 4 (discussing the
religious convictions of the Melbourne Seven).
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Other critics save their harshest words for the theological
underpinnings of religious opposition. Columnist Beatrice Faust quips
that "[absolutist] religions don't like euthanasia because it might lead to
free will."' 55 One commentator, Raymond Tallis, notes that "[o]nly those
theologians who believe that there are more important things than human
happiness feel that the dying should earn their death the hard way and go
the whole distance along the tunnel of barbed wire." He adds that one
cannot feel safe at the hands of those for whom, after all, "excruciating
pains have a deep and inalienable meaning as the 'kisses of Christ. '"156
c. The slippery slope
It would not be fair to portray the churches' opposition to euthanasia
solely in terms of abstract theology. Social concerns are central to the
views held by many religious commentators. A recurrent theme is the
"slippery slope" argument, or fear that "if voluntary euthanasia was
permitted, it would not stay voluntary for very long."'1 57  In its most
extreme form, the slippery slope argument is a charge levelled at doctors
who would become uncontrollable "rambo-types," "prone to a lust for
killing that could end in a Nazi-like holocaust." 158 At the social level, the
argument conjures up a "parade of horribles"' 159 and a wasteland of
nihilistic killing. This "parade of horribles" could not occur so long as
doctors practiced euthanasia or assisted suicide for the original purposes
for which these practices were legalized. Robert Manne argues however,
that,
[fjor anyone who understands social process the expansion
of the circle of those who can be killed will come as no
surprise. For once we agree to the principle of doctors
performing voluntary euthanasia by what effort of societal
will, on what rock of ethical principle, can we resist its
extension to ever new categories of sufferers? There is no
such will: no such fixed and reliable principle. The slippery
slope . . . involves a subtle transformation of ethical
1s5 Faust, supra note 134, at 26.
156 Raymond Tallis, Is There a Slippery Slope?, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 12, 1996,
at 3 (reviewing EUTHANASIA ExAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (John Keown
ed., 1995)).
157 Robert Goff, A Matter of Life and Death, 3 MED. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995).
158 Roger Hunt, Euthanasia: An Issue that Won't Die, GEN. PRACT., Sept. 21 -Oct. 4, 1994.
159 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 829.
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sensibility. Over time we become blind to how we once
thought. 6 0
Manne neglects to mention that the sanctity of life ethic has already
been significantly watered down by the courts and legislatures of British
Commonwealth and American jurisdictions. 6 ' He is right, however, to be
concerned that legalization will result in a re-orientation of moral
sensibilities. Legalized euthanasia will change norms and values. Thus,
for example, in a society that has legalized and has become accustomed to
assisted suicide, the argument that medically assisted death should be
widened to permit active voluntary euthanasia would seem all the more
logical because of the changes in social values that accompany legalization
of PAS.
Nevertheless, to assert this is not to demonstrate the preconditions
for Auschwitz. The social preconditions to "communal moral
deterioration" are worth studying. But as Burgess points out, slippery
slope theorists bear the burden of proof and need to put forward a detailed
case.' 62 Even so, the preoccupation which many opponents of PAS/AVE
reform have with the slippery slope argument, serves a useful function. It
focuses attention upon the bedrock values of society, and upon the gradual
and imperceptible changes which have occurred over decades. It is this
issue, considered from a legal perspective, which is the focus of Part III of
this article.
5. Politicians
In Westminster-style democracies whose Constitutions largely lack
substantive rights guarantees, such as Australia, or Britain, the prospect of
euthanasia law reform is remote in the absence of legislative change. This
is in contrast to the United States, where PAS reforms have also emerged
through private challenges to the constitutionality of legislation
criminalising PAS, or through citizen-initiated referenda.
Within a parliamentary context, the reform process ultimately relies
upon (i) broad public support; (ii) successful advocacy by major players in
the political debate; and (iii) parliamentary facilitators. This creates
problems, since euthanasia is generally not a party-political issue, and
would therefore, ordinarily, attract a conscience vote. In the Northern
160 Robert Manne, The Slippery Slope is a Life and Death Argument, THE AGE (Melb.), June
14, 1995, at 18.
163 See discussion infra Part III.
162 J. A. Burgess, The Great Slippery-Slope Argument, 19 J. MED. ETHICS 169, 170 (1993).
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Territory, the passage of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995) was
largely due to the hard work and personal commitment of the former
Chief-Minister, whose private member's Bill was backed by his own
power and influence. 163  Other private members' Bills introduced by
Independents and Opposition members in the ACT and South Australia,
respectively, have failed.
164
In the Australian State of Victoria, by contrast, the inability of the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society to find a private member to sponsor a
reform Bill is one reason why the euthanasia debate has not gotten beyond
the press, and why advocates such as the "Melbourne Seven" have
resorted to increasingly high profile-some would say exhibitionist-
tactics to get the issue onto the political agenda. It is hardly surprising that
politicians should seek to avoid a divisive issue like euthanasia. A former
Australian Governor-General's 65 support for euthanasia had politicians
from both sides of politics running for cover.166
6. Patient Groups: AIDS & Euthanasia
Increasingly, patient groups, particularly HIV/AIDS groups, are
entering the euthanasia debate. Plaintiff/appellants in both the recent
Ninth Circuit' 67 and Second Circuit 168 cases overturning provisions
criminalising PAS in Washington and New York, respectively, included
AIDS patients and physicians. There are at least four issues which
potentially underlie the involvement of people living with AIDS
("PLWAs") and their advocates in the euthanasia debate: the medical
realities of HIV disease, the social construction of AIDS, the demographic
features of PLWAs, and the practice of euthanasia within the HV
community.
163 Geoffrey Lee Martin, Euthanasia to be legalised by Australian State, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 12, 1996, at 19.
1 See Justine Ferrari & David Nason, States Grapple with Euthanasia, AUSTRALIAN, May 26,
1995, at 1.
165 The Governor-General, who represents the British Queen in right of the Commonwealth of
Australia, is the Australian Head of State. Tony Abbott, No Place for an Elected Head of State,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, AUS File.
166 A Right to Live, and Die, Without Intervention, AUSTRALIAN, June 23, 1995, at 12; PM
Ducks in Hayden Uproar, THE AGE (Melb.), June 23, 1995, at 4.
167 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
168 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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a. The medical realities of HIV disease
AIDS refers to a series of life-threatening conditions which
represent the end-stage of infection caused by the HIV virus.6 9 HIV
weakens the body's immune resistance causing normally containable
illnesses such as tuberculosis to be virtually untreatable. Previously rare
diseases such as Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia, Kaposi's Sarcoma, or
Cytomegalovirus have entered mainstream vocabulary as major AIDS-
defining illnesses. AIDS symptoms include chronic diarrhea, emaciation,
neurological complications, blindness and dementia. While good
palliative care may bring pain under control in many cases, the misery and
debilitation of AIDS is well known. 7 ° As stated on affidavit by Dr Peter
Shalit, one of the plaintiffs in the Compassion in Dying litigation:
One patient of mine, whom I will call Smith, a fictitious
name, lingered in the hospital for weeks, his lower body so
swollen from oozing Kaposi's lesions that he could not
walk, his genitals so swollen that he required a catheter to
drain his bladder, his fingers gangrenous from clotted
arteries. Patient Smith's friends stopped visiting him
because it gave them nightmares.' 7 '
As a spectrum of illnesses which frequently require hospitalization,
yet rarely kill straight away, AIDS produces a fluctuating terminal phase
which is shot through with uncertainty. While successive bouts of illness
are certain, the form they will take is unknown. The psychosocial impact
of AIDS is enormous, and may also result in financial problems,
discrimination and loss of privacy.172 Soberingly, some AIDS medications
may also contribute to depression or delirium, in turn eliciting suicidal
thoughts.'73
Significantly, the medical realities of AIDS appear to have given
greater legitimacy to euthanasia as an option for PLWAs in the terminal
'69 Adam Car, What is AIDS?, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA 1,3 (Eric Timewell, Victor Minichiello &
David Plummer eds., 1992).
170 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814.
171 Id.
17 The legal literature dealing with these and other HIV-legal issues is enormous. For an
Australian perspective, see Roger S. Magnusson, A Decade of HIV Testing in Australia: Part 1: A
Review of Current Legal Requirements 18 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 341 (1995); A Decade of HIV Testing
in Australia: Part 2: A Review of Some Current Debates, 18 U. NEW S. WALES L J. 364 (1995).
173 Gina Kolata, Aids Patients Seek Solace in Suicide but Many Risk Added Pain in Failure,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at Cl.
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stages of disease. In the late 1990s, AIDS has become the disease which
most justifies a person's right to die.'74
b. The social construction Of AIDS
AIDS remains a highly stigmatized condition. People with AIDS
suffer not only the uncertainties of an ultimately lethal illness, but also
from a socially constructed "spoiled identity,"' 175 which feeds upon fear,
ignorance and the need to create a "comforting and differentiating moral
rationale to account for the arbitrary tragedy of illness and death." 176
The gay community has borne the brunt of HIV infection in
"Pattern I" countries such as the United States and Australia. The burden
of AIDS and its fifteen year legacy of communal grief must be understood
within the context of a culture of body-consciousness and hedonism,
within a community revitalised through the 1970s, and finding a political
voice. The physical stigmata of AIDS were the antithesis of tolerance and
new-found freedom. Sontag notes in a well-known passage:
[T]o get AIDS is precisely to be revealed, in the majority of
cases so far, as a member of a certain "risk group," a
community of pariahs. The illness flushes out an identity
that might have remained hidden from neighbours, job-
mates, family, friends. It also confirms an identity and,
among the risk group in the United States most severely
affected in the beginning, homosexual men, has been a
creator of community as well as an experience that isolates
the ill and exposes them to harassment and persecution. 177
The symptoms of AIDS thus have profound moral, social, and
physical significance. As one patient reported, "[w]hat I have is fatal
Kaposi's Sarcoma, and I wear my disease like a scarlet letter."' 7 1 Justice
Michael Kirby, the newest appointee to the Australian High Court'7 9
174 Battin, supra note 24, and accompanying text.
175 Marcia Abramson, Keeping Secrets: Social Workers and AIDS, 35 SOC. WORK 169, 171
(1990).
176 William F. Flanagan, Equality Rights for People with AIDS: Mandatory Reporting of HIV
Infection and Contact Tracing, 34 MCGILL L.J. 530, 549 (1989).
17 SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 24-25 (1990).
179 Joan Jacob et al, AIDS-Related Kaposi's Sarcoma: Concepts of Care, 5 SEMINARS IN
ONCOLOGY NURSING 263, 270.
179 The High Court is Australia's highest appellate court, the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme
Court. The highest appellate courts of the Australian States are called Supreme Courts. See, e.g.,
Chris, Merritt, Chief Judge Calls for New Court of Appeal, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 8, 1993, at 7,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, AUS File.
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observes, "[t]he connection with blood, sex and death presents a metaphor
which is vividly etched upon the consciousness of society. If cancer is a
predicament causing death which has to be whispered, HIV/AIDS is all too
often the condition that dares not speak its name."'
'Ig
Hardly surprisingly, AIDS has become "the great secret," the stuff
of media exposes and speculation, frequently concealed from one's own
family, or dressed up in pseudonyms. In an era of gay pride, the ongoing
impact of guilt and unresolved sexuality, silent legitimators both of self-
hate and community homophobia, has also been given too little attention.
A number of studies have found elevated suicide rates in people with
HIV/AIDS when compared with the general population.' While the area
is complex, review studies confirm that suicide risk is particularly high
following a diagnosis of HIV or AIDS, and following the onset of
HIV/AIDS symptomatology.' 2  Uncertainty over when the next life-
threatening episode will occur and what it will be; fear of physical
decrepitude, ugliness, and dementia; the loss of intimate personal
relationships, the shame of becoming an object of gossip, rumour and
moralizing; the promise of a hard death, the background subculture of
grief-in short, the medical reality and the social construction of AIDS,
combine to amplify the desire to go early.
c. AIDS advocacy, ideology and euthanasia
The medical realities and the social construction of AIDS, while
enough perhaps to distinguish AIDS from other diseases, do not entirely
explain the legitimating effect which AIDS has had upon the push for
euthanasia reform. Seale and Addington-Hall note that pro-euthanasia
advocacy has been associated with "modem, urban cultural conditions;"
the AIDS community, in turn, is predominantly urban, young, male and
1S0 Justice Michael Kirby, AIDS: A New Realm of Bereavement, paper delivered at the Third
International Conference on Grief & Bereavement in Contemporary Society, Sydney, July 4, 1991, at
7.
"' See, e.g., Timothy Cotd et al., Risk of Suicide Among Persons with AIDS, 268 JAMA 2066
(1992) (reporting men with AIDS were 7.4 times more likely to have suicided compared with
demographically similar men in the general population); Cesar A. Alfonso et al., HIVSeropositivity as
a Major Risk Factor for Suicide in the General Hospital 35 PSYCHOSOMATICS 368 (1994); Peter
Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 JAMA 1333 (1988); Brian Kelly &
Beverly Raphael, Psychiatry, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA 347 at 353 (Eric Timewell, Victor Minichiello &
David Plummer eds., 1992) (reporting preliminary Australian data suggesting suicide rates for HIV
infected persons of up to fifty times higher than the general population).
12 Seth C. Kalichman & Kathleen J. Sikkema, Psychological Sequelae of HIV Infection and
AIDS: A Review of Empirical Findings, 14 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 611, 623-625 (1994); see also
Fabrizio Starace, Suicidal Behaviours in People Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus: A
Literature Review, 39 THE INTER'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 64 (1993).
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liberal or non-religious.18 3 Thus, the philosophical preconditions to pro-
euthanasia attitudes are more likely to be present. Many of those with
HIV, or at highest risk of contracting it, are gay; they are educated,
articulate, and come from an activist community, capable of pursuing this
aspect of patient self-determination with the same sort of zest with which
other gay law reform and HIV patient issues have been pursued.
Research suggests a high level of support for the option of
euthanasia within the HIV community. In a 1993 Sydney study by Tindall
and others, 90% of men with either AIDS or AIDS-related complex
indicated that they would personally wish to have the option of euthanasia
if a life-threatening diagnosis were made. Interestingly, 86% of the 105
subjects stated that they were afraid of suffering, but only 19% feared
death itself. 4
The rapid dissemination of information about euthanasia within the
gay and WV/AIDS communities as a result of networking also needs to be
recognized. Sometimes the provision of information is explicit. For
example, in a highly controversial publication, four Sydney doctors
released a leaflet containing a "euthanasia recipe" as part of a series on
WV/AIDS treatments.8 5
d. The practice of euthanasia upon PL WAs
It is possible that AIDS will have an even greater impact upon the
euthanasia movement in future. In Australia, the next few years will see a
peak in the number of AIDS cases, arising from the initial high levels of
infections in the early and mid 1980s. The influx of clients, together with
falling levels of hospital funding will put further pressure on MV services.
There is a trend towards home nursing, where institutional constraints
represent less of a disincentive to involvement in euthanasia.
It is clear that assisted suicide and euthanasia are already practiced
within the HIV community. 6 Battin notes that PAS is "so widely
accepted that it is virtually legal ... among people with AIDS in the gay
communities of the US west coast."' 87 In a Dutch study of homosexual
men with AIDS carried out between 1985 and 1992, 22% of men were
1"3 Seale & Addington-Hall, supra note 40, at 652-53.I" Brett Tindall et al., Attitudes to Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in a Group of Homosexual
Men with Advanced HIV Disease, 6 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 1069 (1993).185 Lyle Chan et al., This Way Out, AIDS X (Information Sheet No. 8, Dec. 1994).
186 Battin, supra note 24, at 215
1"7 Battin, supra note 24, at 215. For articles relating to euthanasia within the San Francisco
AIDS community, see, Sheryl Stolberg, Ending Life on Their Own Terms, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at
Al; Julian Guthrie, AIDS Victims Vow to Defy Suicide Ban, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1996 at Al;
George Raine, Doctor Offers AID in Dying, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1995 at AI.
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found to have died through assisted suicide or euthanasia,'88 twelve times
the national euthanasia rate of 2.1% as estimated in the Remmelink
study.189 Interestingly, life was estimated to have been shortened by less
than one month in 72% of the euthanasia cases. The authors point out that
the likelihood of euthanasia increased with duration of survival after the
AIDS diagnosis, thus linking euthanasia with loss of quality of life and the
desire to avoid further suffering. 90
In Canada, on the day that PAS campaigner Sue Rodriguez died,
detailed evidence of euthanasia within the HIV community was released
by Vancouver social worker Russell Odgen.' 9' Believed to be the first
empirical research on assisted suicide and euthanasia in North America,
Ogden's study, a published form of his Master's thesis, was based on
accounts of involvement by physicians, social workers, counsellors,
teachers and writers. 19 The study detailed the legacy of PAS/AVE
prohibition, including evidence of "botched suicides," resulting from a
lack of appropriate medical knowledge. The heady combination of AIDS
and euthanasia has not gone unnoticed by the media: in Australia, for
example, the trial of a reportedly HIV positive Sydney man who aborted a
mutual suicide pact with his lover, formed after listening to the final aria of
the opera Madame Butterfly. 193
7. The Media
This paper will not consider the discourse of euthanasia through the
media beyond noting that here, as elsewhere, the power of the media in
shaping the debate is unrivaled. Somerville notes that "[w]e are ... media
societies. We are the first age in which our collective story-telling takes
M' See Patrick J.E. Bindels et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in Homosexual
Men with AIDS, 347 LANCET 499, 502, 503 (1996).
1s9 Paul van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of
Life, 338 LANCET 669 (1991). See infra note 358, and accompanying text.
190 Bindels et al., supra note 188, at 503.
191 Douglas T. Vansun, Mercy Killing Secret World Revealed, WEEKEND SUN (Vanc.), Feb. 12,
1994, at Al, A2; Suicide Study Attracts Continent Wide Attention, VANC. SUN, Feb. 15, 1994, at B6;
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Vancouver AIDS Suicides Botched, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at C12.
192 RUSSEL D. OGDEN, EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE IN PERSONS WITH AQUiRED
IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) OR HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (HIV) (1994).
191 Dominic O'Grady, Judge Urges Compassion for Gay Couple, SYDNEY STAR OBSERVER,
Sep. 7, 1995, at 1. See also D. Buchanan, Bond for Man in Euthanasia Case, 7 HIV/AIDS LEGAL
LINK 24 (1996) ($500 fine and good behaviour bond following guilty plea to charge of aiding and
abetting an attempted suicide by crushing fifteen codeine phosphate tablets in a glass of orange juice
for lover).
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place through television. A terminally ill person, begging for euthanasia,
makes emotionally gripping television." 194
As a collective social experience, the euthanasia debate has been
largely shaped by media coverage of euthanasia "news stories." Jack
Kevorkian is a world-renowned celebrity. It is thanks to the media that he
and others like him have been able to effectively promote their cause. The
"Linares affair"-where a distraught father kept nurses at bay with a gun
while he disconnected the respirator keeping his comatose, fifteen month
old son alive-was splashed across televisions and newspapers
internationally, not to mention medico-legal journals.'95 The case of
George Delury, a prominent New York editor who assisted in his
terminally ill wife's suicide, made the newspapers in Australia. 96 As
noted previously, HIV/AIDS has accentuated the pathos and urgency of
the euthanasia debate,'9 creating images of proud and once-beautiful
young men in the prime of their years, asking for death. 98
8. Players in the Euthanasia Debate: Conclusion
A variety of factors have converged to give the debate over
PAS/AVE particular significance and urgency in the last years of the
twentieth century. Making sense of the debate involves listening to the
voices of those who have a particular stake in it, including doctors, the
churches, the media-informed public, and those able to effect legal change,
such as parliamentarians and judges.
Several issues stand out in the review presented above. The public
and the medical profession are increasingly supportive of PAS/AVE
reform. The true level of medical support is, however, obscured by the
194 Margaret Somerville, Sentencing Society to Ethical Death, THE AGE (Melb.), Nov. 13,
1995, at 13. Few people could have remained unaffected by a 1995 Dutch documentary, screened in
England, North America, Australia, and other countries, which showed Dutchman Kees van Wendel de
Joode, who suffered from a degenerative muscular disease, being put to death by his family doctor.
"95 See, e.g., Symposium, Family Privacy and Persistent Vegetative State: A Symposium on the
Linares Case, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 295 (1989).
19 Phillip McCarthy, New York Confronts Right-to-Die Case, THE AGE (Melb.), July 7, 1995,
at 8; Carey Goldberg, A Meal, a Deadly Potion, A Major Legal Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at A2;
Death: Chosen, Assisted, at Home, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 17, 1996, at Al 3. In May 1996, seventy-
two year-old Delury was sentenced to six months prison (following a plea-bargain) for assisting in his
wife's death, who had multiple sclerosis. George Delury Sentenced for Aiding Death of his Wife,
ERGO! U.S. NEWS BULLETINS, supra note 29, May 17, 1996.
"9 See, e.g., Alana Valentine, The Long Vigil, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 3, 1995, at 11.
198 In Australia, see, e.g., Adam Taor, HIV Lobby Fuels Euthanasia Fire, AUSTRALIAN
DOCTOR Nov. 25, 1994, at 29; Ebru Yaman & Justine Ferrari, Lawrence Retreats on Support for
Euthanasia, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 4-5, 1995, at 9; Victim Demands Help for a Death with
Dignity, THE AGE (Melb.), Mar. 28, 1995, at 3. In the United States, see, e.g., Gina Kolata, AIDS
Patients Seek Solace in Suicide, But Many Risk Added Pain in Failure, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at
CI.
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conservatism of some high profile, professional bodies who largely
represent the conservative elements of the profession (e.g. the Australian
Medical Association). In Australia, as support firms within the medical
profession, one can expect that PAS/AVE reform will follow within
Australia's more populous states. In the United States, where reform does
not necessarily depend upon legislation, much depends upon the decision
of the Supreme Court.
It has been argued that underlying the euthanasia debate is an
ideological struggle between competing world views.199 Opposition to
legalized euthanasia reflects a perspective which is essentially
conservative and communitarian, and which is more likely to be informed
by the teachings of an authoritarian and hierarchal church. Advocacy for
the legalized killing of consenting, terminally ill patients, on the other
hand, reflects a perspective which is essentially liberal, individualistic, and
more likely secular.
200
Society has prohibited euthanasia for at least two thousand years.
This prohibition is embedded not only in the moral teachings of churches,
and in the professional codes of doctors, but also in the law. Nevertheless,
the ethic of liberal individualism has already, within a few short years, had
a significant impact upon individuals' legal rights. It is the changes which
have already occurred, as explained in Part III, which make the
completion of euthanasia law reform inevitable over the next few years.
III. THE DECLINE OF THE SANCTITY OF LIFE ETHIC IN LAW
What has happened to the sanctity of life ethic, that it can now be
challenged head-on by doctors, in many cases with apparent impunity, and
with broad community support? After all, the idea that all human life is
equally and intrinsically precious, and should never be taken, regardless of
its value as perceived by others, has been central to the moral foundations
of society for many centuries. Although far from secure in the face of war,
capital punishment, and religious and ethnic persecution, the sanctity of
human life ethic of the Judeo-Christian tradition has been profoundly
civilizing. In the words of one New Zealand judge, the preservation of life
is an ideal "which not only is of inherent merit in commanding respect for
the worth and dignity of the individual but [it] also exemplifies all the finer
virtues which are the mark of a civilised order." ' 0 ' By affirming life for
199 See Holden, supra note 138.
200 See Holden, supra note 138.
201 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, [ 1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235, 244.
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all, we affirm the value and meaning of our own lives and our common
humanity.
But times are changing. Traditionally, the law has protected both
the individual's right to autonomy and self-determination on the one hand,
and the individual's right to physical or bodily integrity on the other. With
active voluntary euthanasia, however, these objects of the law's protection
come into conflict, creating a tug-of-war between the right of the
individual to pursue his or her personal interests without interference, and
the prohibition against harming others which is embodied in law for the
good of the whole community.
Slowly, however, the sanctity of life ethic is giving ground to a
liberal individualist ethic which is gradually yet perceptibly shifting the
moral premium from longevity and onto quality of life. This shifting
emphasis is clearly evident when one considers the cumulative effect of:
* the changing definition of death;
* the recognition that patients have the right to refuse medical
treatment even where this will result in their death;
the recognition that there is no duty to maintain life when a patient
is permanently unconscious;
and now, as reflected in recent caselaw and legislation in the United
States and Australia, respectively, the recognition that terminally ill
patients who are competent may obtain medical assistance to end
their life.
Voluntary euthanasia of the terminally ill is thus the most recent
(and probably not the last) weigh-station in an ethical journey away from
the sanctity of life ethic.
A. The Silent Retreat From Absolutism
1. The Definition of Death
a. "Whole-brain" death
The capacity for artificial respiration and life-support systems to
sustain the biological functions of the body almost indefinitely, despite the
permanent loss of consciousness, has created problems for the sanctity of
life ethic. An extreme or vitalist form of the ethic would require that all
possible measures were taken to preserve life, regardless of whether the
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brain had, in fact, ceased to function. A subtle way of avoiding the
imperatives of a vitalist ethic, therefore, was to re-define death itself.
These days, death is defined either in terms of the permanent
cessation of heart-beat, blood circulation and breathing ("heart/lung
death"), or as the irreversible cessation of the ftnctions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem ("brain death"). The concept of brain death
emerged from the work of an ad hoc committee established by the Harvard
Medical School in 1968.202 The Committee reported in the Journal of the
American Medical Association that "responsible medical opinion" 203 was
ready to adopt new criteria for pronouncing death in circumstances where
an individual had suffered "irreversible coma as a result of permanent
brain damage." 2" Importantly, the Committee made it clear that it was
concerned only with "those comatose individuals who have no discernible
central nervous system activity., 205 This qualification was crucial. The
Committee was advocating new criteria for diagnosing irreversible coma
resulting from permanent brain damage which could serve as a new
definition of death, but only in respect of patients who had irreversibly lost
all brain function, including brain-stem function.206 Nevertheless, by re-
labelling as a "ventilated corpse," someone who might otherwise have
been thought of as alive, the Harvard Brain Death Committee (as it
became known), avoided the ethical injunction to prolong life at all
costs.
20 7
In the decades following the Harvard Committee's report, the
concept of brain-death has been accepted into the law of most western
countries. In 1981, the President's Commission in the United States
recommended uniform legislation embodying both heart/lung and whole
brain criteria.208  By 1995, thirty-three states had adopted the Uniform
Determination of Death Act which gives effect to this recommendation.20 9
In 1977, the Australian Law Reform Commission also recommended the
introduction of a statutory definition of death which included the concept
202 The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Irreversible Coma, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 339 (1968).
203 Id. at 337.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 The Harvard criteria did not seem to preclude reflex activity originating from the spinal
cord, although the Committee noted that loss of function at this level would also frequently be present.
Id. at 340.
207/Id.
201 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL
AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 2 (198 1).
209 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 443 (Supp. 1995).
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of whole-brain death.2'0  All states except Western Australia have now
enacted such legislation.E11
b. "Higher-brain" death
In the 1990s, the push is on for a further re-definition of death to
include "higher-brain death." Interest in the concept of higher-brain death
has emerged following improvements in the ability of medicine to
preserve life in patients who are in a permanent coma, or in a persistent
vegetative state. A persistent vegetative state which is regarded as
irreversible is called a permanent vegetative state ("PVS"). 2 12 A PVS may
arise following irreversible damage to the cerebrum, which-whether
alone or in interrelationship with the brain-stem-is thought to control
"higher-brain" functions including consciousness, thought, feeling and
memory. Unlike patients in a permanent coma, PVS patients may seem
awake, and may follow sleep-wake cycles, although they show no
awareness and do not respond to visual, auditory, tactile or noxious
stimuli. Because the brain stem continues to function, however, the
patient may retain gag, cough, sucking and swallowing reflexes, and may
make spontaneous movements or noises. n3 A prognosis of PVS implies,
however, the permanent loss of consciousness, cognitive function and
sensory capacity, although the patient may breath without assistance, and
may live for years and even decades with artificial feeding and
hydration.21 4
In England, PVS was brought into the public arena through the case
of seventeen year-old Tony Bland, whose lungs were crushed and
perforated in the fatal crush at the Hillsborough football stadium on April
15, 1989. Bland's cerebral cortex, through prolonged deprivation of
oxygen, had "resolved into a watery mass., 215 In the United States, well-
210 THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 7: HUMAN TISSUE
TRANSPLANTS, §§ 133-37 (1977).
211 See, e.g., Human Tissue Act § 33 (1983) (N.S.W.); Human Tissue Act § 41 (1982) (Vict.).
212 The prognosis of PVS patients is linked to the cause of the coma. Some patients may regain
awareness after 4 months in a persistent vegetative state, although few will ever reach full
independence. Keith Andrews, Recovery of Patients after Four Months or More in the Persistent
Vegetative State, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 1597, 1597 (1993); The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS,
Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Pt. 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572 (1994).
213 See generally Robin S. Howard & David H. Miller, The Persistent Vegetative State, 310
BRIT. MED. J. 341 (1995); The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State (Pts. I & 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1572 (1994).
214 A 1994 review estimated that there are between 10,000 and 25,000 adults in the United
States in a persistent vegetative state, and between 4,000 and 10,000 children. The Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Pt. 1), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499,
1503 (1994). In Britain the estimate is 1,000 to 1,500. Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 879.
215 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 833.
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known cases of PVS patients include Karen Quinlan,2 16 and Nancy
Cruzan,2 7 both of whom sustained irreversible injuries as a result of
oxygen deprivation (anoxia).
A higher-brain definition of death remains controversial because of
its creeping infringement upon the sanctity of life ethic, and the judgment
it conveys about the moral status of human beings. One advocate of a
higher-brain definition, Professor Robert Veatch, Director of the Kennedy
Institute of Medical Ethics at Georgetown University, admits that his
preference is based upon the moral judgment that the essence of
personhood or "being human" is the integrated functioning of mind and
body.21 As Justice Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion in the Cruzan
case,
for patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness
and no chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to
whether the mere persistence of their bodies is "life" as that
word is commonly understood . . . . Life, particularly
human life, is not commonly thought of as a merely
physiological condition or function. Its sanctity is often
thought to derive from the impossibility of any such
211reduction. 21
Although different definitions of higher-brain death are possible,
Veatch advocates defining higher-brain death in terms of the "irreversible
cessation of the capacity for consciousness. ' 2 0  Catholic bioethicists
disagree. Dr. Norman Ford, Director of an Australian Catholic bioethics
institute, writes that "permanently unconscious patients and new-born
babies, including anencephalic infants, are human subjects with personal
dignity whose lives are morally inviolable."
221
Professor Peter Singer of the Monash University Centre for Human
Bioethics, has taken a third view. He is conscious of the argument that it
is counter-intuitive to call a PVS patient "dead." Such patients breath,
their bodies are warm; and some, such as Nancy Cruzan, can orally ingest
some nutrition. Brain-dead patients can even sustain the life of a foetus for
216 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
217 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
219 Robert M. Veatch, The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death, 23
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18, 23 (1993).
219 Id. at 345-46.
220 Veatch, supra note 218, at 23.
221 Norman Ford, Killing and Caring don't Mix, THE SUNDAY AGE (Melb.), Oct. 29, 1995, at
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several months until birth.222 Writing about anencephalic infants, Singer
argues that it is preferable simply to accept that organs may be removed
for transplantation from infants whose lack of a cerebral cortex
permanently precludes any capacity for consciousness and feeling.223
Singer's logic also implies that it would be acceptable to remove organs
and tissues from adult patients in a permanently vegetative state, or indeed
to "end the life" or "biological processes" of such patients, regardless of
whether such patients could be said to be already "dead." Singer's views
on euthanasia and the morality of killing infants have generated heated
debate, and he has been accused of advocating infanticide.224
The simplistic distinction between life and death which Singer
wishes to avoid perpetuating could perhaps be overcome by recognising
that death is not so much an event, as a process which can occur at
different levels of organization within the human body.225 Nevertheless,
the view that death is a series of morally significant gradations, instead of
an "event," is likely to be rejected as making the law unworkable. A
precise and uniform definition of death is critical in areas of law
concerned, for example, with homicide, succession and tissue and organ
transplantation. Proposals for a "higher brain" definition of death are
further muddied by the fact that many advocates believe such a definition
should be implemented with a conscience clause so that people can elect in
advance the criteria of death they wish to apply to them.226
If in future PAS/AVE were to become widely legalized, one might
speculate that public opinion would more readily acknowledge that
euthanasia was justified not only when a person's quality of life was
destroyed by terminal illness, but also when a person was unable to
experience conscious life at all. Within this environment, social norms
would change, and the view that permanently unconscious and insensate
individuals should really be regarded as already dead, may have greater
persuasive force. For the present, however, in the absence of the
widespread social consensus necessary for the adoption of higher-brain
222 See PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE & DEATH 9-I1 (1995) referring to the case of Trisha-
Marshall, a woman from North Oakland, California, who was diagnosed as brain dead on Apr. 19,
1993 following a shooting, yet who sustained the life of her foetus until it was born by caesarean
section on Aug. 3, 1993.
223 Anencephalic infants are born with only a brain stem and, like PVS patients, are permanently
unconscious, insensate and unknowing. Id. at 46-56.
224 For critical reviews of Singer's work, see, e.g., Jenny Teichman, Humanism and Personism,
QUADRANT, Dec. 1992, at 26; Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Peter Singer on Euthanasia, 76 MONIST 135(1993); Per Sundstrm, Peter Singer and "Lives Not Worth Living"--Comments on a Flawed
Argument from Analogy, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 35 (1995).
223 Linda L. Emanuel, Reexamining Death. The Asymptomatic Model and a Bounded Zone
Definition, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 32 (1995).
226 Veatch, supra note 218, at 21-22.
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death as a legal definition of death,227 the retreat from the sanctity of life
ethic has largely been played out within the context of the withdrawal of
medical treatment. The question is not, therefore, "is the patient already
dead?" but, "is there a duty to keep the patient alive any longer?"
2. The Right to Self-Determination and the Withdrawal of Life-
Preserving Medical Treatment
In January 1985, former Australian water-ski champion John
McEwan dived into the Murray river at Echuca (a town on the New South
Wales/Victorian border), and suffered spinal injuries which rendered him
quadriplegic. A year later, when he asked for the withdrawal of the
ventilator which was keeping him alive, his doctor's insurers refused,
fearing litigation.228 When McEwan subsequently went on a hunger strike
in Melbourne's Austin Hospital, he was certified as insane. That
certification was not revoked until he agreed to accept food, take anti-
depressant drugs and undergo counselling.229
a. Advance directives, living wills and other statutory schemes
The issues which emerged from the debate accompanying the
McEwan case will be familiar to American readers, as the American States
have led in the development of statutory models for medical self-
determination. 23 ° The debate in Victoria resulted in the Medical Treatment
Act (1988) (Vic), which gives competent adult patients a statutory right to
refuse medical treatment generally, or particular kinds of medical
treatment.23' This right of refusal operates, however, only in respect of a
"current condition. , 23 2 Nor does it extend to the refusal of palliative care,
which includes the provision of reasonable procedures to relieve pain, and
the reasonable provision of food and water. 233 Refusals are recorded in a
"refusal of treatment certificate., 234 A doctor who ignores the certificate
and treats a patient may be guilty of medical trespass.
235
227 Raymond J. Devettere, Neocortical Death and Human Death, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 96, 101 (1990).
228 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Some Refusals of Medical Treatment which Changed the Law of
Victoria, 157 MED. J. AUSTL. 277 (1992).
229 Peter Ward, New Life in the Death-with-Dignity Debate, AUSTRALIAN Oct. 14, 1987, at 11.
230 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3200-3211 (West 1996).
231 Medical Treatment Act (1988) (Vict.).
32 Medical Treatment Act § 5 (1988) (Vict.).
233 Medical Treatment Act § 4 (1988) (Vict.).
234 Medical Treatment Act § 5 (1988) (Vict.).
23 Medical Treatment Act § 6 (1988) (Vict.). Similar legislation operates in the Australian
Capital Territory. Medical Treatment Act §§ 6-12 (1994).
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In Australia, when a patient becomes incompetent, decisions
regarding his or her medical treatment are made by the patient's legal
guardian, in accordance with the patient's best interests. Before this, an
application must be made to the relevant Guardianship and Administration
Board for the appointment of the guardian. The guardian's authority is
usually described as encompassing those decisions which a parent would
be authorized to make on behalf of a child, although consent to certain
prescribed, or major medical procedures may still require the consent of
the Board.236 A number of Australian States have followed their American
counterparts by enacting legislation which authorizes a spouse, carer,
friend or relative to consent to medical treatment on a patient's behalf, a
power which would not otherwise exist unless that person was the
incompetent patient's legal guardian.237
Statutes in some States provide for consent to be given to medical
treatment on behalf of an incompetent person through the appointment of
an enduring (medical) power of attorney. This legislation, however, does
not on its face authorize the refusal of life-preserving treatment by the
attorney on behalf of the patient.238 Broader legislation exists in Victoria
and the Australian Capital Territory, however, that specifically authorizes
a patient to confer an enduring medical power of attorney upon an agent,
who then has authority to refuse medical treatment on the patient's behalf,
in circumstances where the patient later becomes incapacitated.239 An
example of this could be a declaration by the agent in the appropriate form
that an insensate patient would not have wanted to have particular invasive
treatment given, or resuscitation in the event of a medical crisis. 240
South Australia and the Northern Territory have recognized
incompetent patients' right of self-determination in slightly different
terms. Legislation in both jurisdictions enables a competent person to
make a "living will., 24I A "living will" is a formal direction refusing
"extraordinary measures" in the event that the person becomes
236 See, e.g., Guardianship and Administration Board Act §§ 24, 36-42 (1986) (Vict.). Under
Australian common law, court approval is required for the sterilisation of an incompetent person.
Secretary, Dep't of Health and Community Servs. v. J.W.B. and S.M.B. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218.
237 Guardianship Act §§ 35-37 (1987) (N.S.W.); Guardianship and Administration Act § 59
(1993) (S. Austl.); Guardianship and Administration Act §§ 4, 39 & 43 (1995) (Tas.). Similar
legislation exists, for example, in California. CAL. PROBATE CODE §§ 3200-3211 (West 1995).
238 See Guardianship and Administration Act § 25 (1993) (S. Austl.) (refers to refusal, although
unclear whether this extends to withdrawal of life-preserving treatment); Guardianship and
Administration Act §§ 4, 32, 36-46 (1995) (Tas.); Powers of Attorney Act § 13 (1956) (Austl. Cap.
Terr.).
239 Medical Treatment Act § 5B (1988) (Vict.); Medical Treatment Act §§ 13-18 (1994) (Austl.
Cap. Terr.).
240 See DAVID LANHAM, TAMING DEATH BY LAW 79-80 (1993).
241 Natural Death Act (1983) (S. Austl.); Natural Death Act § 4 (1988) (N. Terr.).
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incompetent and suffers from a terminal illness.242  "Extraordinary
measures" include artificial ventilation, intravenous hydration and
feeding, dialysis, transplants of vital organs, and other procedures which
prolong life by "supplanting or maintaining the operation of bodily
functions that are temporarily or permanently incapable of independent
operation." 243
The Australian legislation thus includes a variety of mechanisms
(advance directives, including "living wills," and proxy decision-making
under a court appointed guardian or pursuant to an enduring medical
power of attorney), which enable patients to exercise-to varying
degrees-a right of bodily self-determination encompassing a right to
hasten death by refusing life-preserving medical treatment.
In the United States, individual states also retain wide latitude to
develop their own law and policy regulating the withdrawal of life-
preserving medical treatment. In Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department
of Health, the United States Supreme Court declined to constitutionalize
the withdrawal of treatment issue to a point which limits diversity between
states.244 This diversity is evident from a survey of state laws that employ
the above identified mechanisms.245 Unlike Australia, United States
federal law also requires health care providers receiving Medicare or
Medicaid funds to inform competent adult patients in writing of relevant
state laws dealing with living wills and other advance directives, and to
record in the patient's medical record, and to abide by, any directives the
patient has made which comply with state law.246
In California, for example, a person can execute a "living will" that
requires the patient's physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment in the event of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious
condition where the patient is unable to make the decisions for himself or
herself.247 Similarly, patients may appoint a durable power of attorney for
242 Natural Death Act (1983) (S. Austl.); Natural Death Act § 4 (1988) (N. Terr.).
243 Natural Death Act § 3 (1983) (S. Austl.); Natural Death Act § 3 (1988) (N. Tern.). For
further discussion, see Danuta Mendelson, Medico-Legal Aspects of the "Right to Die" Legislation in
Australia, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 112 (1993); David Lanham & Belinda Fehlberg, Living Wills and the
Right to Die with Dignity, 18 MELB. U. L. REV. 329 (1991).
244 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
245 See Judith Areen, Advance Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions, 19 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 91 (1991).
246 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1996).
247 Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194 (West 1996). Life
sustaining treatment is "medical intervention that will only prolong the process of dying or an
irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state." Id. § 7186. California was the first jurisdiction to
enact "living will" legislation, in 1977. Henry Weistein. Assisted Suicide Deaths Ruled Legal; Ninth
Circuit Lifts Ban on Doctor-AidedSuicides, " L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3. 1996, at 1.
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health care, 24 8 which confers on the attorney power to consent to, to refuse
or to withdraw, on behalf of the patient, any medical treatment related to a
physical or mental condition, subject to any limitations contained in the
durable power of attorney, and the patient's wishes as made known to the
attorney.249 Pursuant to the enduring power of attorney for health care, the
attorney is empowered to make such decisions regarding healthcare as the
patient could make himself or herself, including the refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment.2 5 0 The attorney's decision-making power
does not extend to authorising decisions relating to abortion, sterilisation,
convulsive treatment and commitment to a mental health facility.'
Although the legislation permits what is sometimes called "passive
euthanasia" (death resulting from the withdrawal of life-preserving
treatment), it does not permit active euthanasia, or any "affirmative or
deliberate act or omission to end life."252 The California legislation was
unaffected by the Ninth Circuit decision in the Compassion in Dying
case, 253 which relates only to competent patients. Finally, in the absence
of both a "living will," and an enduring power of attorney for health care,
a duly-appointed guardian or "conservator" may nevertheless make
treatment decisions on the patient's behalf, including the withdrawal of
life-support from a permanently unconscious patient.254
b. The right of self-determination at common law
Except where excluded by legislation, a right of self-determination
may also exist at common law. Courts in the industrialized common law
democracies have increasingly affirmed the general principle that
competent adult patients have the right to decide for themselves whether to
undergo medical treatment.2 15  British Commonwealth and American
courts have recognized that, provided the patient is competent to make the
249 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4700-4806 (West 1996).
249 Id § 4703, § 4720.
250 Id § 4724.
25 Id § 4722.
252 Id § 4723.
253 See generally Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
254 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355; Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
255 In United States, see, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1914); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990); In Australia, see, e.g.,
F. v. R., 33 S.A. St. R. 189, 193 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (en banc); Rogers v. Whitaker, 175 C.L.R. 479, 486-
487 (Austl. 1992); In England, see, e.g., Sidaway v. Bd. of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985]
App. Cas. 871, 882, 888; In Canada, see, e.g., Rodriguez v. B.C. (Attorney-General), 107 D.L.R. 4th
342, 398-399 (Can. 1993); In New Zealand, see, e.g., Smith v. Auckland Hosp. Bd., [1965] N.Z.L.R.
191,219; Auckland Area Health Bd. v. Attorney-General, [1993] I N.Z.L.R. 235, 245.
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decision, and provided his or her wishes have been properly ascertained,
the law will respect this right, even if it will have fatal consequences for
the patient.256 In January 1996, for example, an anorexic woman was
permitted to die in an English hospital, despite the wishes of her family
that she receive nourishment through a drip.257 The basis for this right is
that medical treatment involves the intentional infliction of physical force
upon the body. Subject to emergencies and other exceptions, therefore,
medical treatment administered by a doctor is only lawful when the patient
consents to it. The right to refuse medical treatment is thus an expression
of the right not to be subjected to unlawful assault.25 '
In the United States, the right of a competent person to refuse
unwanted medical treatment is not only a common law right, but an aspect
of the "liberty" which citizens enjoy under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution 5 9  This "liberty" interest is not, however,
unqualified. Where a state, through legislation or administrative action
opposes, burdens or regulates the withdrawal of treatment from a patient in
a particular case, courts will determine whether the patient's constitutional
rights have been violated by balancing his or her liberty interests against
the relevant opposing state interests.260  These state interests include the
interest in preserving human life, discouraging assisted suicide, and
256 In United States, see, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1986); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E. 2d 77 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E. 2d
651 (Ga. 1989). In England see, e.g., In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1993] Fain. 95, 115, 116-
117, 121; In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [ 1994] I W.L.R. 290, 294-295; Airedale N.H.S. Trust
v. Bland, [1993] App. Cas. 789, 857-59, 864, 883; Secretary of State v. Robb, [1995] Fam. 127
(competent adult's right to self-determination prevails over any countervailing state interest). In
Canada, see, e.g., Nancy B. v. H6tel-Dieu de Quebec, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (1992).
257 Woman Suffering from Anorexia Insists on Being Allowed to Die, 15 MONASH BIOETHICS
REv. 4 (1996).
259 See, e.g., Secretary, Dep't of Health & Community Servs. v. J.W.B. & S.M.B., 175 C.L.R.
218, 309-3 10 (Aust. 1992).
259 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-279 (1990). In so holding,
the Supreme Court rejected the view that the right to refuse medical treatment was part of any right of
privacy recognized under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 279 n.7; cf Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976).
260 As noted elsewhere (see, e.g., James Bopp, Jr., & Thomas J. Marzen, Cruzan: Facing the
Inevitable, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 37, 38 (1991)), it is significant that the Cruzan majority
identified the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest as an "interest," rather than a "fundamental
right." The Supreme Court has recognized that liberties regarded as "fundamental" in character
cannot, by virtue of the Due Process Clause, be overridden without due process of law, which requires
the State to show that its law serves a "compelling state interest" which justifies the encroachment
upon personal liberty. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479-99 (Goldberg, I., concurring),
503-504 (White, J., concurring) (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). By contrast, where
fundamental liberties are not threatened, a State need only demonstrate a "rational relation" between
the legislation, and a legitimate State interest pursued through that legislation. Unlike the abortion
cases, which recognized abortion as a fundamental liberty, the right to have life-preserving treatment
withdrawn is merely a liberty interest. The Rehnquist court's Cruzan decision thus only gives weak
support for a "right to die."
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ensuring that the patient's choice is informed and unambiguous through
heightened evidentiary requirements.2 61  It was assumed in the Cruzan
court opinion, however, that "the United States Constitution would grant a
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition. '
'26 2
As a result of the Cruzan decision, it is clear that when a patient is
incompetent, state laws limiting or regulating the withdrawal of life-
support may vary significantly without necessarily infringing the patient's
constitutionally protected liberty interest.2 63  Nancy Cruzan was a PVS
patient who had suffered oxygen deprivation for twelve to fourteen
minutes after her car overturned in an accident and she was thrown face
down into a water-filled ditch. When it became clear that Nancy had
virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents requested
the withdrawal of the hydration and nutrition procedures that were keeping
her alive.2' The Supreme Court held, however, that the State of Missouri
was justified in continuing treatment in the absence of "clear and
convincing" evidence that Nancy would have wished treatment to be
withdrawn under such circumstances. 65  The "clear and convincing"
evidence standard is notoriously difficult to satisfy. In Cruzan, for
example, the Missouri Supreme Court found that Nancy's previous
statement, that "if she were sick or injured she would not wish to continue
her life unless she could live at least halfway normally,, 266 did not satisfy
the clear and convincing standard.267
The Cruzan case was thus a set-back for the right to bodily self-
determination in Missouri. However, nothing in the case precludes other
states from adopting a different approach.2 68 The Court reviewed a variety
of approaches adopted by other states, unified by their general preference
for a "substituted judgment" rationale. A substituted judgment approach
requires courts to second-guess whether an incompetent patient would
261 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-81.
262 Id. at 279. See also Id. at 287-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263 Id. at 261.
2M Id. at 265-67.
265 Id. at 287.
2M Id. at 268; Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). A "clear and
convincing" evidence approach also operates in New York. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 53 I
N.E. 2d 607 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).
267 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
263 The decision does not change the law in any state nor require physicians to act differently.
George J. Annas, The Long Dying of Nancy Cruzan, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 52, 58 (1991).One limitation, as intimated by Justice O'Connor, was that the patient's constitutionally protected
liberty interests could be implicated if a State simply refused to implement the decision of a duly
appointed surrogate, regardless of whether clear and convincing evidence of the patient's previous
wishes had been given. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990).
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have wanted treatment withdrawn, if he or she could have foreseen the
injury which was sustained.26 9 Some states have accepted that while
explicit evidence of what the patient would have wanted may be helpful
and compelling, it is not necessary for the exercise of substituted judgment
by a guardian. In these cases, the guardian tries to decide what the patient
would have decided, guided by the patient's general value system.27° Still
other courts have accepted that a substituted decision should be made in
the patient's "best interests," taking what is known of the patient's
attitudes, and his or her medical prognosis, into account. 271 This approach
operates in California. 72 Some courts have moulded elements of each of
the above approaches, enabling a "best interests" decision to be made
only in the absence of trustworthy evidence, or any evidence, of what the
patient would have wanted.273
Enough has been said to show that the legal recognition of a right of
bodily self-determination through legislation and under common law,
extending as it does to the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment, is a
major development which undermines a "life-at-all-costs" approach.
Although the exercise of this right is complicated if the patient is
incompetent, legislative mechanisms such as living wills and medical
powers of attorney, and the substituted judgment approach of the United
States courts, all attempt to ensure compliance with "what the patient
would have wanted." English courts, by contrast, have rejected the idea of
"substituted judgment" to determine whether treatment should be
withdrawn from a patient who has become incompetent, focusing instead
on what is in the patient's "best interests. "274 This focus, in turn, has
contributed to a third development undermining the sanctity of life ethic-
legal recognition of what amounts to the concept of a "futile life."
269 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-73.
270 See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (11. 1989).
271 See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185.
272 Id.
273 See, e.g., In re. Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1985).
274 In Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] App. Cas. 789, the leading English case, the
House of Lords held that the decision to withdraw treatment from a permanently unconscious patient is
a medical decision for the doctor, although it required scrutiny by a court, until a sufficient body of
experience and practice had grown which obviated this need. Id. at 859 (Lord Keith), at 871 (Lord
Goff), at 875 (Lord Lowry), at 885 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Implicit in this approach was a
rejection of the United States' "substituted judgment" approach. Id. at 864-65, 871-72, 873-74 (Lord
Goff), at 895 (Lord Mustill).
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3. "Futile Lives," "Best Interests" and the Withdrawal of Life
Support
a. The Anthony Bland case
In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Britain's highest court, the House of
Lords, was faced with the case of Anthony Bland, whose liquefied cerebral
cortex permanently precluded any return to consciousness, cognition or
sensory perception. 275 For nearly four years, when the House of Lords
handed down its judgment in February 1993, Bland had lain in a persistent
vegetative state which doctors had concluded was irreversible. Faced with
this situation, Bland's parents wanted the artificial feeding and other
measures keeping their son "alive" to be withdrawn.2 76 Doubts over the
criminal law, however, led to litigation and eventually to a declaratory
judgment. The law Lords were unanimous that where, in accordance with
a responsible body of medical opinion, a doctor concludes that further
medical treatment will be of no benefit to a permanently unconscious
patient, there is no duty to provide it, and such treatment may legally be
withdrawn.277 As Singer has recognized, this decision represents a
significant retreat from the sanctity of life ethic, and plants the seeds for
further change in the future.278
It is fundamental that in their provision of medical treatment to
incompetent patients, doctors owe a duty to act in the patient's best
interests.279 When a patient is terminally ill, the patient's best interests
may only require sedation or pain relief, to permit the patient to die with
dignity.28 ° It is well accepted that there is no duty to continue medical
heroics when death is imminent and inevitable. 28 1 But what about a patient
who is permanently unconscious, although not terminally ill? The mean
survival time of PVS patients like Anthony Bland (provided hydration and
273 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 789.
276 Id at 789-90.
277 Id. at 858-59 (Lord Keith); Id. at 867-69 (Lord Goff); Id at 876-77 (Lord Lowry); Id. at
883-84 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Id. at 897-99 (Lord Mustill).
27S Peter Singer, Presidential Address: Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill? 9 BIOETHICS
327, 337-342 (1995).
279 E.g., In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), [1990] 2 App. Cas. 1.
290 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] App. Cas. 789, 867 (Lord Goff); see also Judge
Devlin's statement to the jury in the trial of Dr. Adams (supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text) that
where "the purpose of medicine--the restoration of health-could no longer be achieved, there was
still much for the doctor to do, and he was entitled to do all that was proper and necessary to relieve
pain and suffering even if the measures he took might incidentally shorten life by hours or perhaps
even longer." Palmer, supra note 45, at 375.
2"' Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 858-59 (Lord Keith); Id at 867-69 (Lord Goff); Id. at 876-77 (Lord
Lowry); Id. at 883-84 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Id. at 897-99 (Lord Mustill).
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nutrition are continued) is approximately two to five years, with some
patients living for decades.2"2
According to Lord Mustill, Anthony Bland had "no best interests of
any kind." '283 Thus, while the termination of Anthony's life might not
have been in his best interests, Anthony's best interests in being kept alive
had also disappeared, together with the justification for the indefinite
continuation of life support.28 4 In a similar vein, Lord Keith observed that
where a person has no cognitive capacity whatever, and no prospect of
recovery, "it must be a matter of complete indifference whether he lives or
dies. ,"285
To suggest that it was a matter of complete indifference whether
Anthony Bland lived or died obviously reflected a moral judgment about
the value of his life. In Lord Mustill's view, the withdrawal of medical
treatment was both ethical and legally permissible because "the continued
treatment of Anthony Bland can no longer serve to maintain that
combination of manifold characteristics which we call a personality."286
While not turning his mind to a higher-brain definition of death, Lord
Mustill was adopting the same criterion as a basis for withdrawing
treatment in circumstances where death would certainly follow. Each of
the other law Lords' speeches reflected, or were consistent with, Lord
Mustill's reasoning. 28 7 Lord Goff noted,
for my part I cannot see that medical treatment is
appropriate or requisite simply to prolong a patient's life,
when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind,
as where it is futile because the patient is unconscious and
there is no prospect of any improvement in his condition ...
But in the end, it is the futility of the treatment which
justifies its termination.88
Their Lordships accepted, essentially, that there is no moral value in
preserving the life of a permanently unconscious person. Anthony Bland's
life, in other words, was "futile" and this justified the withdrawal of the
treatment which was keeping him alive. Two of their Lordships went
282 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State
(Pt. 2), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1575 (1994).
283 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 897.
2U Id.
285 Id. at 858.
286 Id. at 899.
287 Id. at 869 (Lord Goff); Id. at 858 (Lord Keith).
288 Id. at 869.
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further and held that where treatment can no longer be said to be in the
patient's best interests, there is a duty to stop treatment.289 The implication
from the Bland case is that the law does not protect the sanctity of life of
patients who are permanently unconscious. By putting Bland into
practice, doctors not only ensure that such patients will die, but their
actions bespeak the view that such patients would be better off dead. In
Bland, their Lordships justified the withdrawal of intravenous feeding and
hydration, which ended a patient's life through dehydration, not through
an act of self-determination, but because they considered his life to be
futile and meaningless.29 °
b. The discredited act/omission distinction
Both advocates 291 and opponents292 of legalized euthanasia have
recognized that the Bland case represents a significant retreat from the
sanctity of life ethic. Furthermore, the reasoning in the case is unstable,
and likely to crumble in a way which further undermines this ethic. This is
because, while authorising the withdrawal of Anthony's treatment, their
Lordships affirmed that euthanasia is unlawful, thus requiring a distinction
to be drawn between the twO.2 93
Lord Mustill, Lord Goff, and (apparently) Lord Keith, resorted to
the familiar act/omission distinction. The lawful withdrawal of treatment
can be regarded as an omission to provide treatment which there is no duty
to provide, and not as an "active measure," such as murder or non-
voluntary euthanasia. Thus, when the patient dies, the doctor cannot be
regarded as legally responsible, under the law of homicide.2 94
289 Id. at 876-77 (Lord Lowry); Idat 883 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
2W In Bland, permanent lack of consciousness was taken to imply that Bland had no "best
interests". Bland, [1993] App. Cas. At 869. Where a patient is not permanently unconscious, English
courts focus exclusively upon the patient's best interests, when deciding about medical intervention
upon an incompetent patient. Courts have not accepted, however, that the sanctity of life ethic will
always dictate that the patient's best interest require the prolongation of life. In one recent English
case, the court accepted that where a newly bom yet non-terminally ill baby's deformities, viewed
from the perspective of a person able to make a sound judgment, were such that life would be
intolerable, then life-preserving ventilation could lawfully be withdrawn. In re J (Wardship: Medical
Treatment), [1991] Faro. 33, 46-47, 55. "1 consider the court is entitled in the best interests of the child
to say that deliberate steps should not be taken artificially to prolong its miserable life span." In Re J at
55.
291 E.g., Peter Singer, supra note 278.
M E.g., J.M. Finnis, Bland: Crossing the Rubicon? 109 LAW Q. REv. 329, 335 (1993); J.M.
Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMtNED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 30-34 (John Keown ed., Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 859 (Lord Keith); Id. at 865 (Lord Goff); Id. at 892-93 (Lord
Mustill).
294 Id. at 858-59 (Lord Keith); Id at 865-66, 873 (Lord Goff); Id. at 887; Id. at 897-98 (Lord
Mustill).
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Lord Mustill admitted that to absolve doctors from causing the
death of a patient who, quite literally, would die from the withdrawal of
fluids, on the basis that withdrawing intravenous hydration and
nourishment was an omission, and not an act, was "morally and
intellectually dubious,"'2 9 and served only to emphasise "the distortions of
a legal structure which is already both morally and intellectually
misshapen. 2 96  Lord Goff conceded that the distinction could lead to a
"charge of hypocrisy," 297 and with good reason. Since doctors have the
ability to prolong life, the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment shortens
life, thereby causing death.2 98 As Justice Scalia recognized in the Cruzan
case,29 9 an "omission" or "withdrawal" of treatment would not be ignored
if a nurse turned off a ventilator without permission, or if a parent starved
an infant; this would be murder.300 The fact that the doctor has no duty to
keep administering treatment, because the patient's life is considered
"futile," should not lead one to think that the doctor has not caused the
patient's death. In their eagerness to distinguish euthanasia, the law Lords
were camouflaging the real issue-whether withdrawing life-support and
so ending a patient's life was justified in the circumstances. Better to see
the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment for what it is-a form of non-
voluntary euthanasia30'o-and to justify it on ethical or policy grounds,
than to pretend that doctors are not, as a matter of law and morality,
actually killing the patient.30 2
A more honest approach is evident in a recent New Zealand case
which concerned the withdrawal of ventilation from a patient with
Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, a disease which destroys the conductivity of the
295 Id. at 898.
296 Id. at 887.
297 Id. at 865.
2 9 For the purposes of the law of murder, it is irrelevant that a person (the patient) would have
died soon anyway. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 45, at 375 (Citing Devlin, J., in Dr. Adam's trial).
299 Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 297; 111 L Ed 2d 224, 253-54
(1990).
300 Id.
301 Lord Lowry, in fact, did recognize that the Bland case might be seen as an example of
"euthanasia in action." Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 877.
302 Some Catholic commentators employ an additional distinction between "intending" the
patient to die and "willing" or "permitting" the patient to die: Moria M. McQueen & James L. Walsh,
The House of Lords and the Discontinuation ofArtificial Nutrition and Hydration: An Ethical Analysis
of the Tony Bland Case, 35 CATH. LAW., 363, 370-77 (1994). This is even shakier than the
act/omission distinction. Should a doctor who withdraws life-preserving treatment from a "futile"
patient and who intends the natural consequences of his or her actions be regarded as acting immorally,
and/or illegally, as against the doctor who is oblivious to those consequences, or who shelters in the
belief that he or she is passively letting nature take its course? How can this distinction encourage
doctors to take moral responsibility for their actions?
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nerves between the brain and body, leaving the patient unable to move or
communicate.0 3 Justice Thomas said,
In my view, doctors have a lawful excuse to discontinue
ventilation when there is no medical justification for
continuing that form of medical assistance. To require the
administration of a life-support system when such a system
has no further medical function or purpose and serves only
to defer the death of the patient is to confound the purpose
of medicine.3"4
If one recognizes, therefore, that the act/omission distinction is
spurious, and that doctors are entitled to hasten the death of PVS patients,
then why should not doctors be permitted to hasten death by lethal
injection, instead of subjecting the patient's family and carers to the stress
of watching the patient's (albeit unconscious) body die from acute
dehydration or malnutrition?30 5 Lord Mustill's response: "sadly[,] it is for
the best,, 30 6 hardly satisfies. Furthermore, when a patient is competent
and in the painful or anguished end-stages of a terminal disease, and
clearly is conscious and aware of his or her interests, why should not
doctors be permitted to cause death directly? English law provides no
satisfying answer to this question. In Bland, their Lordships simply
affirmed that euthanasia was illegal, that legalization was a question for
Parliament, and that under the current law, "the interest of the state in
preserving life overrides the otherwise all-powerful interest of patient
autonomy."3 07
Significantly, in the United States, the moral and legal distinction
between withdrawing life-support, and causing death through more direct
303 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235, 250 (per Thomas,
J., emphasis added).
304 Id
305 While the absence of cortical function suggests that PVS patients would not suffer any
distress, specialists point out that reflex responses to pain (withdrawing or grimacing) may remain, and
that starvation may cause agitation, "presumably due to the release of brain stimulating chemicals in
response to hypoglycaemia." Keith Andrews, Patients in the Persistent Vegetative State: Problems in
their Long Term Management, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 1600, 1601 (1993). Dr. Keith Andrews, who gave
evidence in the Bland case, notes paradoxically that "[w]e seem to be progressing down the road of
accepting involuntary euthanasia before voluntary euthanasia has been accepted legally. It is unlikely
that starvation would be regarded as an acceptable way of assisting dying in voluntary euthanasia, so
should we even consider this method for involuntary euthanasia?" Id. at 1602.
306 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 898 (Lord Mustill).
307 Id. at 893 (Lord Mustill). Lord Goff also noted that "whereas the law considers that
discontinuance of life support may be consistent with the doctor's duty to care for his patient, it does
not, for reasons of policy, consider that it forms any part of his duty to give his patient a lethal injection
to put him out of his agony." Id. at 866.
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measures, has been rejected by both the Ninth308 and Second Circuit 30 9
Courts of Appeal. In the Compassion in Dying case, Judge Reinhardt,
delivering the court opinion for the Ninth Circuit stated,
we see little, if any difference for constitutional or ethical
purposes between providing medication with a double effect
and providing medication with a single effect, as long as one
of the known effects in each case is to hasten the end of the
patient's life. Similarly, we see no ethical or
constitutionally cognizable difference between a doctor's
pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs
which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own
life.31
0
Similarly, in Quill v Vacco, 31 1 the Second Circuit regarded the
disparity between New York State law which permitted a competent
patient to hasten their death by withdrawing life-support, yet prohibited a
person from hastening their death by self-administering prescribed drugs,
as evidence that the latter provisions, which prohibited assisted suicide,
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 2 It
is implicit in this conclusion that there is no relevant legal or moral
difference between the omission and the positive act, at least where the
positive act consists of prescribing lethal injections for self-administration
by a competent and terminally ill patient. The deeper logic which
underlies the rejection of the act/omission distinction may eventually
persuade U.S. courts to legalize active voluntary euthanasia (AVE), and
not merely physician-assisted suicide (PAS).
"Medical futility" can be described as a prognosis that further
therapy will not benefit a patient.313 Courts are increasingly accepting that
medical futility is a justifiable basis for withdrawing life-preserving
treatment.3 4 In Bland, however, the House of Lords arguably went
further, and held that life-support may be withdrawn, not merely because a
patient was dying, or would not improve with further treatment, but
because the patient's life itself was futile and meaningless. It was this
30S Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
309 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996).
310 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790, 824.
311 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716.
312 Id. at 40-41.
313 Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility, 20 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 310 (1992).
314 See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court of California, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Auckland Area Health Board v. Attorney-General, [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235, 252-53.
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moral judgment which Britain's highest Court adopted as a way of
ensuring Anthony Bland's demise. In contrast, the American-style
"substituted judgment" approach, preserves the fiction of self-
determination by trying to determine "what the patient would have
wanted." '315
The decision in Bland is likely to be influential in Australia. It is
not inconceivable that it might also be influential within the United States.
The Cruzan decision does not change the law regulating the withdrawal of
medical treatment in any State. As Justice O'Connor intimated, the
"social laboratory" is free to continue.316 Unlike abortion, Supreme Court
decisions have not federalized and constitutionalized the withdrawal of
medical treatment issue. It remains open for States to embrace "medical
futility" as a basis for withdrawing life-preserving treatment in a patient's
best interests, as an alternative to the substituted decision approach. Such
an approach would, however, preclude family members from requiring the
continuation of life-support systems for PVS patients or anencephalic
infants.3
17
B. The Right to Die: An Emerging Jurisprudence
It is no accident that in the late 1990s we are seeing the emergence
of a legal right to die. Such a right follows naturally from a jurisprudence
which has already significantly undermined the sanctity of life ethic by re-
defining death; and by recognizing a right of personal autonomy which
extends to the withdrawal of life-support. This right of personal autonomy
may be exercised despite supervening incompetence through advance
directives and other statutory mechanisms. Additionally, the United
Kingdom has accepted that, regardless of previously-expressed wishes,
life-support may be withdrawn if one's life is considered "futile" because
of permanent unconsciousness.3"8 An interesting variety of forms of the
right to die are emerging, reflecting different legal structures, as reviewed
below.
315 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 271-73, I11 L Ed 2d 224, 250-51 (1990).
316 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292.
317 See, e.g., the debate which arose over the case of Baby K, an anencephalic infant whose
mother insisted on continued mechanical intervention: Marcia Angell, M.D., After Quinlan: The
Dilemma oftthe Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1524 (1994); George J. Annas,
J.D., M.P.H., Asking the courts to set the Standard of Emergency Care-the Case ofBaby K, 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1542 (1994). The US Court of Appeals upheld the mother's right to insist on continued
treatment: In re Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91, 130 L Ed
2d 42 (1994).
3"8 See Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 789.
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1. Australia's Northern Territory
In late February 1995, barely three weeks after first announcing his
intention to introduce legislation recognizing the right to die,3 19 the Rights
of the Terminally Ill Bill was tabled by Chief Minister Marshall Perron in
the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly,32 ° In the course of his first
reading speech, Perron said:
Through the laws in place today, society has made an
assessment for all of us that our quality of life, no matter
how wretched, miserable or painful, is never so bad that any
of us will be allowed to put an end to it. I am not prepared
to allow society to make that decision for me and for those I
love.
3 2 1
Perron's initiative ushered in three months of frantic lobbying in the
Territory, as well as a raucous, nationwide debate. Perron observed wryly
after the Bill had been safely passed that in his experience there were few
"swingers" in the debate, and that both inside and outside politics, almost
everyone retained their original support for, or opposition to, voluntary
euthanasia, despite the arguments presented on both sides.
322
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act was passed in a conscience
vote at 3:15 a.m. on May 25, 1995 by a fifteen to ten majority of the
Northern Territory Legislative Assembly. 323  The passing of such
important social legislation within a brief three months must count as
some sort of a record. Importantly, the legislation authorizes both active
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.324  The legislation has been
stridently criticised by churches. The Australian Catholic Bishops
Conference reminded Catholics in a pastoral letter that humans must not
play God, and although "there is no virtue in suffering for its own sake...
the experience of death is a profoundly Christian experience when we go
319 Chips MacKinolty & Daniel Lewis, NT to Vote on Assisted Suicide, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Feb. 2, 1995, at 2.
320 Marshall Perron, First Reading Speech to the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill, Northern
Territory Legislative Assembly (Feb. 22, 1995.)
321 Id.
322 Marshall Perron, speech given at conference entitled "Death and the State," Centre for
Public Policy, University of Melbourne, (Aug. 24, 1995.)
323 Justine Ferrari & David Nason, States Grapple with Euthanasia, AUSTRALIAN, May 26,
1995, at 1; Gay Alcom et al., Kennett Flags Right-to-Die Bill, THE AGE (Melb.), May 26, 1995, at 1.
324 Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995) (NT) § 7(l)(a).
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to meet God at the moment when God chooses to call us." '325 The
Australian Medical Association also opposed the legislation,32 6 and has
since assisted in a failed constitutional challenge to the Act which is now
on appeal to the Australian High Court.327
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995) has stimulated a
growing body of scholarly comment.328 The Act contains a variety of
safety mechanisms designed to prevent abuse. The principal features are
as follows:
* Only patients age eighteen or older suffering terminal illnesses can
be assisted;
329
* The treating doctor must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the
patient is experiencing pain, suffering or distress to an extent
unacceptable to the patient, and that there is no treatment reasonably
available to the patient, other than palliative care; 33°
* A second doctor must confirm the treating doctor's prognosis; 33 1
* A third doctor, who must be a qualified psychiatrist, must certify
that the patient is not suffering a treatable clinical depression;33 2
* The treating doctor must counsel the patient as to treatment options,
including palliation, counselling and psychiatric support; must be
satisfied that the patient has considered the effect of the decision
upon family, and that the decision is freely and voluntarily made.
Information about palliative care options must be given either by the
treating doctor or another doctor who satisfies legislative criteria
ensuring specialist knowledge in palliative care. Following the
counselling, the patient must reaffirm his or her decision;3 3
325 Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, Pastoral Letter to the Catholic People of Australia,
May 1995. See also, Grahm Downie, Bishops in Joint Pleas on Euthanasia, CANBERRA TIMES, Apr.
29, 1995, at 6; Gay Alcom, Vatican Condemns NT Euthanasia Law, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, May 27-
28, 1995, at 2; Rachel Buchanan & Steve Dow, Church Bid for Unity Against Law, THE AGE (Melb.),
May 29, 1995, at 5; Harry Goodhew, Euthanasia Against the Christian Ethic, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 30, 1995, at 13; Elissa Blake, Nazi Threat in Euthanasia, THE AGE (Melb.), July 4,
1995, at 1; Andra Jackson, Catholics Set up Euthanasia Think Tank, AUSTRALIAN July 21, 1995, at 3.
36 Andrew Darby et al, AMA Push for States to Reject Euthanasia, THE AGE (Melb.), May 26,
1995, at 6.
327 Justine Ferrari, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge on Euthanasia, AUSTRALIAN, July 25,
1996, at p 7; Wake v. Northern Territory, unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, July
24, 1996, Martin CJ, Angel & Mildren JJ.
328 See, e.g., 3(2) J. L. & MED. (1995) (special issue on euthanasia).
329 Rights of the Terminally Ill Act § 7(l)(a) (1995) (N. Terr.).
330 Id. §§ 4, 7(1)(b).
331 Id. § 7(1)(c)(iii).
332 Id. § 7(1)(c)(iv).
333 Id. § 7(l)(e)-(h).
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* A cooling off period of 48 hours applies, and the treating doctor
must provide the assistance personally and remain until the patient
has died;
334
* Prior to this, the patient's request to die must be documented,
signed, witnessed and countersigned by the second doctor in
accordance with statutory requirements; 33
5
* A request may be rescinded at any time;336
* The Act requires the treating doctor to document in the patient's
medical record all aspects of the process, including the paperwork
demonstrating compliance with the legislative procedure as it relates
to each of the three doctors involved in the process, noting the drugs
used to bring about death, certifying death, and reporting to the
Coroner, who in turn reports to the Attorney-General;
337
" The Act also requires the use of interpreters holding prescribed
qualifications where the patient and any of the three doctors
involved in the process do not share the same first language.338 The
interpreter must be present at the signing of a request for assistance,
and must not stand to gain anything from the patient's death;339
" Doctors giving assistance may not receive any reward for their
services above a normal fee; 340
" The termination of life in accordance with the Act carries immunity
from civil or criminal liability, and professional disciplinary
action.34'
Despite some talk of repeal following changes in the composition of
the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly, the Act has been in force
since 1 July 1996.342 Importantly, however, the Act is under challenge at
the federal level. A Catholic backbencher's private member's Bill
introduced into Commonwealth Parliament in September 1996 would
334 Id. § 7(I)(n)-(p).
335 Id. § 7(l)(i)-(k).
336 Id. § 10.
337 Id. §§ 12-15.
338 Id. § 7(4).
339 ld- § 7(l)(l)-(mn).
340 Id. § 6(l).
34' Id. § 20(l)-(2).
342 Darwin doctor Phillip Nitschke has developed a computer-controlled, Kevorkian-style, self-
administering "death machine," with software (entitled "Final Exit") written by collaborator Des
Came. Patients move through three computer screens, the last of which says "If you press Yes, you
will cause a lethal injection to be given within thirty seconds, and will die. Do you wish to proceed?
'YES/NO."' Gay Alcom, Press "Yes" to Die Now, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 17, 1996, at A13. Early
prototypes of the machine had a range of CD music to choose from, and ended with the farewell:
"Good-bye and good luck."
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override the Territory legislation, relying on section 122 of the Australian
Constitution, which gives federal Parliament power to make laws for the
territories. This Bill, which will attract a conscience vote, is due to be
debated in late October. Early indications are that it could well be
successful. In the meantime, despite tightened guidelines regulating the
qualifications of specialists giving second opinions, on September 22, the
first case of legalized euthanasia was carried out under the Act.343 A
second death occurred on January 2, 1997.344
Elsewhere in Australia, private members' Bills introduced in South
Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have failed. 345  Reform is
unlikely in New South Wales, following a Parliamentary debate revealing
four-to-one opposition to legalization.346  An Australia-wide response to
the regulation of euthanasia is highly unlikely. State health ministers
defeated a proposal by a former federal Health Minister for a national
taskforce to assess the Northern Territory's legislation and to ensure
uniform state laws.
34 7
2. The British Commonwealth
Australia is the only member of the British Commonwealth yet to
experiment with PAS/AVE law reform. On August 16, 1995, the New
Zealand Parliament rejected by a sixty-one to twenty-nine majority a
private member's Death With Dignity Bill, which would have legalized
voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill.348 In England, a 1994 House of
Lords Select Committee report opposed legalizing euthanasia.349
Similarly, the majority of the Canadian Special Senate Committee on
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, presented its report to Parliament,
343 First Death Under NT Mercy Law, THE AGE (Melb.), Sep. 26, 1996, at 1; Euthanasia Splits
Nation, AUSTRALIAN, Sep. 27, 1996, at 1. Sixty-six year old Robert Dent, a former carpenter and pilot,
who had suffered from prostate cancer for five years, died following a lethal injection supervised by
Darwin doctor Philip Nitschke. Now More Want to Die, THE AGE (Melb.), Sep. 27, 1996, at I.
3" Mercy Death Renews Outcry, THE AGE (Melb.), Jan. 7, 1997, at 1. The second case of
euthanasia was praised by the Victorian Premier. Premier Defends the Right to a "'Beautiful" Death,
THE AGE (Melb.), Jan. 7, 1997, at 4. The Vatican, however, condemned the act. Vatican Urges NT
Euthanasia Battle, THE AGE (Melb.), Jan. 9, 1997, at 3.
345 Andrew Ramsey & Ebru Yaman, MPs Put Brake on Right-to-Die Push, AUSTRALIAN, July
27, 1995, at 1.
346 Open House Slams Door on Euthanasia, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 17, 1996, at I; Historic Debate
Full of Emotion, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 17, 1996, at 4.
347 Gareth Boreham, Australia: Tehan in Clash Over Inquiry on Euthanasia Law, THE AGE
(Melb.), June 15, 1995, at 4; see Tim Stevens, Euthanasia: Nat MPs will Follow Conscience,
AUSTRALIAN, June 19, 1995, at 3.
348 Speden Graeme, Choice Key to Law's Death Bill, THE DOMINION (Wellington), Aug. 16,
1995, at 10; see Speden Graeme, MPs Throw out Euthanasia Bill, THE DOMINION (Wellington), Aug.
17, 1995, at 1.
349 Their Lordships on Euthanasia, 343 LANCET 430 (1994).
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opposing euthanasia, on June 6, 1995 .350 As noted previously, the
Canadian Supreme Court had already determined in the Rodriguez case
351
that the prohibition of assisted suicide does not violate the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.35 2 The European Commission on Human
Rights reached a similar decision, holding that English legislation
criminalising assisted suicide does not violate the right to "respect for
private and family life" in Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. 353
3. The Netherlands
The Netherlands has been a fierce battleground for advocates and
opponents of pro-euthanasia policy.354 Assisted suicide and euthanasia are
illegal in the Netherlands.355  Since 1973, however, caselaw has
established that a doctor who terminates a patient's life in accordance with
certain criteria and then reports the procedure, will not be guilty of any
offense and is unlikely to be charged. To remain unprosecuted, the
termination must follow a persistent, voluntary and well-informed request
from a patient experiencing unbearable pain or suffering, with no
treatment or other options for relief available, and the doctor must consult
with a colleague.356 If these criteria are satisfied, the doctor may rely
successfully upon the defence of necessity or force majeure.35 7 The basis
of this defense is that the doctor's duty to preserve life should not conflict
with the duty to relieve unbearable suffering.
358
350 Canada May Cut Euthanasia Penalties, AUSTRALIAN, June 8, 1995, at 9; see SPECIAL
SENATE COMMITTEE ON EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICDE, FINAL REPORT (Oct. 20, 1996)
<http://www.rights.org/-deathnet/senate.html>.
351 Re Rodriguez and Attorney-General of British Columbia [19931 D.L.R. 342.
352 Id.
353 App. No. 10083/82 v. United Kingdom, 6 EUR. H.R. REP. 140 (1984).
35 See, e.g., Els Borst-Eilers et al., Medical Aspects of Euthanasia, 155 MED. J. AUSTL. 645
(1991); see also Brian J. Pollard, 155 MED. J. AUSTL. 646 (1991) (letter in reply to Borst-Eilers et al.).
355 Dutch Criminal Code, §§ 293-94.
356 John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope? in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 264 (John Keown ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
357 NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE TERMINATION OF LIFE BY A DOCTOR IN
THE NETHERLANDS (1995) (press release on the regulation of euthanasia and assisted suicide in the
Netherlands).
358 ld; see also J. Remmelink, The Legal Position on Euthanasia in the Netherlands (1994)
(paper given to the 6th Annual Australasian Society for HIV Medicine (ASHM) Conference, Sydney,
Nov. 4, 1994). English translation kindly provided by the author.
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a. The Remmelink report
In 1990, in order to inform itself over options for euthanasia law
reform and regulation, the Dutch government appointed a committee to
conduct a nationwide study to quantify the practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands.35 9  The Committee was chaired by Attorney-General
Professor Jan Remmelink, although the study itself was coordinated by
Professor van der Maas from the Department of Public Health at the
Erasmus University. The study proceeded as three sub-studies involving
mailed questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and a prospective survey 60
Journal articles detailing the findings of the Remmelink Report
indicate that in 1990, the estimated incidence of active voluntary
euthanasia, as a percentage of all annual deaths (-129,000 deaths), was
1.8% (-2,300 cases). 6' Similarly, an estimated 0.3% of annual deaths
were the result of assisted suicide (-400 cases). The Report also estimated
an annual figure of 1000 deaths (0.8% of annual deaths) which fell into
neither of the preceding categories, where life was terminated without the
patient's explicit request.362  Referring to these cases of non-voluntary
euthanasia, the authors of the study stated that the patients were "close to
death and were suffering grievously. 3 63 In more than half of cases the
decision had been discussed with the patient or the patient had indicated in
a previous phase of their illness a desire for euthanasia if suffering became
unbearable. 364 The admission of cases of non-consensual euthanasia has
resulted in vehement criticism of the Dutch policy of de-criminalization.
What should be remembered, however, is that non-consensual euthanasia
also occurs in countries where euthanasia is illegal.365 Until the extent of
illegal PAS/AVE is known, therefore, it seems premature to condemn the
euthanasia policy of the one country which has opened itself up to
inspection.
A final important issue from the Remmelink study was the low level
of reporting. Only 591 of the estimated 2,700 cases of active voluntary
... Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 669.
360 Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 669.
361 Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 670.
362 Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 670.
363 Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 69 1.
364 Paul van der Maas et al., supra note 189, at 691; see also Johannes van Delden et al., The
Remmelink Study: Two Years Later, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24 (1993).
365 See, e.g., Sheryl Stolberg, Ending Life on Their Own Terms. L.A. TIMES, Oct. I, 1996, at
Al; Julian Guthrie, AIDS Victims Vow to Defy Suicide Ban, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1996 at Al;
George Raine, Doctor Offers AID in Dying, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1995 at Al.
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euthanasia and assisted suicide were reported. This number excludes the
1000 cases of non-voluntary euthanasia.366
b. The impact of the Remmelink report
The significance of the Remmelink report has been a matter of
heated debate. One line of response is that euthanasia in the Netherlands
remains "unnotified, unchecked and invisible to justice. 3 67  While the
statistical implications of the Report have been misrepresented,368 the low
level of reporting was certainly a cause for concern. The major reasons
given for non-reporting included the desire to avoid the hassle of legal
investigation, the fear of prosecution, and also the desire to protect the
family.369  More recently, the level of reporting has improved.370  In
themselves, however, the Remmelink numbers provide no substance for
the claim that the decriminalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands is
perverting respect for human life, and creating a class of medical killers
with "syringes for hire." Any such claim would require comparison with
other societies where euthanasia has not been decriminalized.37'
Partly as a result of the Remmelink report, the Dutch government
decided not to introduce legislation that would have explicitly legalized
euthanasia.372  Nevertheless, effective on June 1, 1994, a statutory
notification procedure has come into operation in the Netherlands that
embodies fifty criteria which act as guidelines for assessing the decision of
a doctor to terminate the life of a terminally ill patient for whom no
prospect of improvement exists. Doctors' reports are verified by the
3 Johannes van Delden et al., The Remmelink Study: Two Years Later, 23 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 24 (1993).
367 H. Jochemsen, Euthanasia in Holland: an Ethical Critique of the New Law, 20 J. MED.
ETHICS 212, 215 (1994).
3 See, e.g., Brian J. Pollard, Euthanasia in Holland, QUADRANT Nov. 1992 at 42-46; cf
Johannes van Delden et al., Dances with Data, 7 BIOETHICS 323 (1993). As Dr. Helga Kuhse, Director
of the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University, Australia, has noted, depending on what
definition of "euthanasia" is adopted, the Remmelink report provided evidence of between 2,300 and
48,500 cases per year. Helga Kuhse, Dutch Euthanasia Link Overstated, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 12, 1995,
atl10.
369 Chris Ciesielski-Carlucci & Gerrit Kimsma, The Impact of Reporting Cases of Euthanasia
in Holland: A Patient and Family Perspective, 8 BIOETHICS 151, 152 (1994).
370 See van Delden et al., supra note 365, at 25 (1,323 cases reported in 1992); see also Jenifer
Chao, Less Fear on Dutch Mercy Killings, THE AGE (Melb.), Sep. 15, 1995, at 9 (1,319 cases reported
in 1993; 1439 in 1994). A more recent survey to investigate the under-reporting of life-terminating
actions is under way. Marjanke Spanjer, Dutch to Do New Survey on Assisted Deaths, 346 LANCET
833 (1995).
371 An Australian study led by Dr. Helga Kuhse of the Monash University Centre for Human
Bioethics is replicating the questions asked in the Remmelink study; Australian comparative data
should be available in late 1996.
372 Remmelink, supra note 358.
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municipal pathologist and assessed by the public prosecutor, who also
determines whether the doctor can rely upon the force majeure defence."3
It is likely that developments in the Netherlands will continue to
challenge and shock those in other countries. In Australia and the United
States, the euthanasia debate has mostly focused upon PAS/AVE in
relation to terminally ill patients who are competent to choose death. Once
society accepts, however, that an individual's right to self-determination
justifies medical assistance in dying, what logic limits euthanasia to
terminally ill patients?
Those concerned about the "slippery slope" effect point to a highly-
publicized recent case in which the Dutch Supreme Court affirmed that a
doctor may successfully rely upon the necessity defense in circumstances
where the patient's suffering is not caused by a somatic disease.374 In the
Chabot case, the patient wanted to die after her marriage had broken down,
and her two sons and father had died.375 The patient persistently refused
treatment, and was described by the Court to be suffering a "depression in
a narrower sense without psychotic characteristics, in the context of a
complicated grieving process. ' 376  Similarly, opponents of euthanasia
point to the Prins case, where a gynecologist was convicted of murder for
killing a brain damaged spina bifida baby described as "a sleeping plant,"
after consulting with family and colleagues. The Court said, however, that
this decision could "reasonably be considered as justifiable,, 37 7 and no
punishment was imposed378 .
The criteria which must be satisfied to evade criminal liability for
euthanasia in the Netherlands do appear to be less rigorous and precise
than those embodied in the Northem Territory Act.379 John Keown, a
leading English critic of the Netherlands situation has argued,
373 NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 357.
374 Marjanke Spanjer, Assisted Suicide for Mental Distress, 345 LANCET 246 (1995). For an
English-language translation of the Court's decision, see John Griffiths, Assisted Suicide in the
Netherlands: The Chabot Case, 58 MOD. L. REV. 232 (1995); see also Sjef Gevers, Physician Assisted
Suicide: New Developments in the Netherlands, 9 BIOETHICS 309 (1995).
375 John Keown, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Dutch Supreme Court, I Il L. Q. REV.
394, 395 (1995). Dr Chabot was convicted in this case, but on the basis that since the patient was not
suffering a somatic illness, he could not establish the necessity defense without ensuring that a second
doctor had examined the patient. This had not occurred. However, the Supreme Court imposed no
punishment.
376 Id.
37 Dutch Doctor Convicted but not Punished for Euthanasia of Infant, 14 MONASH BIOETHICS
REV. 5 (1995).
371 See Dutch Court Convicts Doctor of Murder, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 1028 (1995); see also
Jenifer Chao, Baby Poses Sad Test for Dutch Euthanasia Law, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 14, 1995, at 8.
37 John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 265-66 (John Keown ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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it is not even possible precisely to identify the legal criteria,
let alone define them: the Supreme Court omitted to lay
down a precise list and lower courts have issued sets of
criteria which are far from congruent . . . . In short, the
Guidelines are simply incapable, because of their vagueness
and the fact that they entrust the decision-making in the
individual practitioner, of ensuring that euthanasia is carried
out only in accordance with the criteria they specify."'
Keown cites the case of a leading Dutch practitioner of euthanasia
who would not rule out performing euthanasia on an elderly patient who
felt he was a "nuisance to his relatives who wanted him dead so they could
enjoy his estate." ''
c. Implications for the United States?
Like the Netherlands, yet unlike Australia, the right to die in the
United States has emerged through court decisions.382 Despite their role in
interpreting the Constitution, courts are not legislatures. Furthermore,
despite the social implications of constitutional decisions, courts make
poor social policy planners. Left to develop like other rights, the risk is
that a common law right to die will lack the fine tuning and level of detail
that is required to protect vulnerable patients and to properly balance
patients' wishes with public interests.
One of the prices paid for constitutionally guaranteed rights is
ambiguity and uncertainty as to their extent of application. One
unfortunate consequence of the Ninth Circuit decision in Compassion in
Dying8 3 is that although it partially invalidated Washington State's
prohibition on PAS, it did not, and could not, replace that prohibition with
a comprehensive regulatory regime. Had it attempted to do so, the court
might well have been criticized for usurping the role of the legislature.
Nevertheless, beyond pointing to the kinds of safeguards incorporated
within model statutes such as Oregon's defeated Death with Dignity
Act,318 it essentially struck down Washington state's prohibition and
30 Id.
381 Id. at 265.
382 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790; Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996).
3"3 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
34 See Melinda Lee & Susan Tolle, Oregon's Plans to legalize Suicide Assisted by a Doctor:
How Much More Open Will the Practice Become?, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 613 (1995); see also Ann
Alpers, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995).
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created the possibility of a "free-for-all" until such time as Washington
State enacted a regulatory framework for PAS.38 5 While constitutional
rights can defeat state legislation and also force reluctant states to "handle
the hot potato" of PAS regulation, they may also facilitate the premature.
birth of emerging rights in the absence of an adequate regulatory
framework.
4. The United States
Statutes prohibiting PAS were recently held to be unconstitutional
by both the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, in so far as they
precluded doctors from prescribing lethal medication for self-
administration by mentally competent patients in the terminal phase of
illness.
a. The Ninth Circuit
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, the Ninth Circuit
held that the right to determine the time and manner of one's death,
encompassing both (i) a patient's right to withdraw life-preserving medical
treatment, and (ii) the right of a terminally ill person to receive life-ending,
physician-prescribed medication, was a liberty interest enjoyed under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.386 The right to refuse
medical treatment, encompassing a right to refuse artificial nourishment
and hydration, followed from the Cruzan case,387 while the right of a
terminally ill patient to PAS was one of the "most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime," was "central to personal dignity
and autonomy," 38 and thus quali fied as a liberty interest.389
The constitutional right to PAS recognized by the court was not,
however, any ordinary Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. The court
opinion stressed that "rational basis review" was not applicable for the
"important interest" at issue.39 While not necessarily claiming that the
right to PAS was a "fundamental" right, which could only be restricted by
385 Any such framework would itself, of course, be open to constitutional challenge if it
overburdened the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.36 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, relevantly,
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
397 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814-17; see also Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
398 Compassion in Dying. 79 F.3d at 813-14.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 804.
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a State law narrowly tailored to serve a "compelling state interest," 391 the
majority effectively rejected the alternative under traditional, two-tiered
due process analysis: i.e., that PAS was a mere "liberty interest" which
could be restricted so long as the state could demonstrate a "rational
relation" between PAS prohibition and a legitimate state interest. In
defining PAS as a liberty interest, the Ninth Circuit majority was strongly
influenced by Planned Parenthood v. Casey where the Court noted that
central to Fourteenth Amendment liberty were "choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy" and that "at the heart of liberty" was "the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life." '392
The Ninth Circuit opinion was really only consistent with a
continuum approach. It rejected the "fundamental vs. non-fundamental"
framework in favor of one where the "more important the individual's
right or interest, the more persuasive the justifications for infringement
would have to be."'3 93  Justice Beezer's dissent, by contrast, focused on
showing that PAS was not a "fundamental right" under traditional tests,394
and that the Casey court formulation was not directed towards identifying
"fundamental liberties," having been given, in any event, within the
different context of an abortion case, which only survives thanks to stare
decisis.395 For its part, the majority held that regardless of whether PAS
was a fundamental right,396 or simply an important liberty interest," it
must be balanced against opposing state interests.398 A controversial
aspect of the majority opinion was, however, that it elevated PAS to
391 See supra text accompanying note 260.
:9 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
93 Compassion in Dying, 790 F.3d at 804.
3W "Substantive due process" rights, according to two regularly cited Supreme Court
formulations, are those rights which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 751 (1987) quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))), or which are so
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). As Justice Beezer pointed out, history or tradition does not support a
legal right to suicide as most States criminalize PAS and allow the State to intervene to prevent
attempted suicide. Nor can it "honestly be said that neither liberty nor justice will exist if access to
physician-assisted suicide is proscribed." Compassion in Dying, 790 F.3d at 849 (Beezer, J.,
dissenting). Finally, the right to withdraw life-preserving treatment recognized in Cruzan was nowhere
recognized as a "fundamental" right. See supra text accompanying note 260.
395 Compassion in Dying 790 F.3d at 849 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
396 Under which, the state was required to show a compelling, narrowly-tailored State interest
justifying restriction under a traditional, Due Process analysis. See Compassion in Dying 790 F.3d at
812.
397 Under which, in accordance with a "continuum approach," the burden of proof in justifying
a restriction depended upon the relative importance of that liberty interest. Compassion in Dying 790
F.3d at 804.
3" Compassion in Dying 790 F.3d at 815-16.
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something more than a mere personal liberty, simply on the grounds of it
being an intimate personal choice, which was "central to human
dignity."399
The majority was on stronger ground in pointing out that a right to
PAS was implicit within the limits of existing law, that already allowed
patients a right to die by self-starvation and authorized doctors to
administer death-inducing medication "so long as they can point to a
concomitant pain-relieving purpose. "400 Existing law also permitted the
withdrawal of nourishment from PVS patients, who would starve to death
as a result.4"' As noted previously, in reaching this conclusion, the court
rejected the notion that there was any relevant difference for constitutional
or ethical purposes between "passively" withdrawing life-support, and
"actively" causing death. 2
The court canvassed a variety of state interests weighing against the
liberty interest of a terminally ill patient in PAS. According to the court,
the state has an interest in preserving life. The interest in preserving life,
however, depends upon relevant circumstances including the medical
condition and wishes of the terminally ill patient. The state of Washington
had already determined that the interest in preserving life gave way under
certain conditions. The Washington Natural Death Act allowed terminally
ill patients to give advance directives, or to refuse lie-preserving treatment.
The court reasoned accordingly that the state interest in preserving life
was diminished where a terminally ill patient desired PAS in order to
avoid pain and suffering.0 3
Other state interests include preventing suicide, precluding undue
influence on the terminally ill and preserving the integrity of the medical
profession.40 4 These risks could be mitigated through the proper regulation
of PAS. Fear that legalized PAS would undermine the integrity of the
profession ignored the fact that many doctors already supported PAS,
terminating life-support systems with patient consent, or administering
lethal doses of pain relief under cover of the "double effect" principle.40 5
The court found that history did not support the prophecies of a slide
towards nihilistic killing which also accompanied legalized abortion and
other changes in the medical profession.40 6
39 Id at 813-14.
400 Id. at 822.
401 Id. at 822-23.
4 Id. at 824.
403 Id. at 817-20.04 Id. at 825-27.
405 Id. at 827-28.
406 Id. at 830.
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that the liberty interest in PAS reached
its peak in the terminally ill, where the State interests identified were for
the most part at a low point. Balancing these countervailing interests, the
liberty interest prevailed, at least where a terminally ill patient sought to
hasten death with physician-prescribed lethal medication.4 7
Although the effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling has been temporarily
blocked by a Supreme Court injunction,4 8 the decision confirms the power
of the courts to effect important policy changes through constitutional
review. The decision gives constitutional protection to terminally ill
patients seeking lethal prescriptions in States falling within the Ninth
Circuit. 4 9 The decision may well spark a challenge to an Oregon District
court decision which held that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act410 was
unconstitutional on the ground that it offended the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 11 The Ninth Circuit did not decide
whether Washington State's blanket prohibition on assisted suicide
violated the Equal Protection Clause, although a footnote in the court
opinion suggests that it was favourably disposed to this argument.
4 12
b. The Second Circuit
Interestingly, the Second Circuit held that New York's assisted
suicide statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, but not the Due
Process Clause.413 Considering the Due Process argument, the Second
Circuit noted that assisted suicide:
cannot be considered so implicit in our understanding of
ordered liberty that neither justice nor liberty would exist if
it were sacrificed. Nor can it be said that the right to
407 Id. at 837.
401 Courts Play "Green Light-Red Light" with Assisted Suicide Rulings, ERGO! U.S. NEWS
BULLETINS (May 26, 1996) <http://www.islandnet.com/-deathnet/ergonewslO.html>; see ERGO!
NEWS ARCHIVES, supra note 29.
409 Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
410 See Melinda Lee & Susan Tolle, Oregon's Plans to legalize Suicide Assisted by a Doctor:
How Much More Open Will the Practice Become?, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 613 (1995); see also Ann
Alpers, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995). The Oregon
Death With Dignity Act, which was narrowly voted into law in November 1994 in a citizen-initiated
referendum, was the first successful attempt by an American State to legalize PAS. Similar, citizen-
initiated laws were voted down in Washington State in 1991 and in California State in 1992.
41 Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F.Supp 1429 (D. Or. 1995). The Equal Protection clause
provides, relevantly, that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
412 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838, n. 300.
413 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is deeply rooted in the
nation's traditions and history."4 '
As noted above, traditional Due Process Analysis requires rights to
be categorized as "fundamental" liberties, or as "mere liberties," and the
Appeals Court evidently agreed with the District Court that absent a
fundamental right to PAS, New York's prohibition was rationally related
to its interests.
Turning to the Equal Protection issue, the argument was that
terminally ill patients who were not reliant upon life-support were denied
equal protection because they were unable to legally obtain assistance in
suicide, whereas, patients on life-support could legally obtain such
assistance by requiring the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment.4 16 The
court identified the legislation prohibiting assisted suicide as social welfare
legislation, the constitutional validity of which thus depended upon
whether the prohibition could be seen to be "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.' 4 17 The court held that it was not.4 8 The Second
Circuit identified some of the same state interests in opposing PAS which
the Ninth Circuit had relied upon in upholding Washington's prohibition
of assisted suicide (prior to the re-hearing and reversal before the full
court).419 It held, however, that the New York statute could not be
rationally related to these interests. New York law already permitted
patients to bring about their death by withdrawing life-support, and
required doctors to co-operate with patients in terminating treatment. In
other words, if these were the real state interests underlying the PAS
prohibition, the state would not have legalized and recognized in
legislation the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment.42 °
As noted previously, this process of reasoning implicitly rejects that
there is any significant legal or ethical difference between withdrawing
life-support and "actively" assisting patients to die by prescribing lethal
drugs. Here, as in Compassion in Dying, the retreat from the sanctity of
life ethic already evident through laws recognising a right to refuse life-
414 Id. at 724; see also Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 848 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
415 See Quill 80 F.3d at 724.
416 Id. at 729.
417 Id at 726-27.
41' Id
419 Id. at 730 (citing Compassion in Dying v State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995),
aff'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790). State interests include: ensuring that the doctor's role did not include a
right to kill; avoiding psychological pressure being placed upon the elderly and infirm to consent to
death; avoiding the exploitation of the poor and minorities; and avoiding facilitating assisted suicide or
euthanasia simply in response to repeated requests from suffering, competent patients (as was alleged
to have occurred in the Netherlands).
420 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d at 730.
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support, combined with the rejection of the "passive withdrawal/direct
action" distinction, compelled courts to recognize a right to PAS through
the prescription of lethal drugs. In other words, once the prescription of
lethal drugs, at the request of a terminally ill, competent patient is not seen
as morally or legally different from withdrawing life-preserving medical
treatment from a terminally ill, competent patient, then legislation which
has the effect of prohibiting the former, while permitting the latter, will be
seen as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 1 The basis of this violation is the fact that patients who are
not on life-support are denied the opportunity to legally commit suicide
with medical assistance, which patients dependent upon life-support can
exercise by requiring doctors to withdraw all treatment.422
In view of the conflicting rationalies of the Circuits, the Supreme
Court has agreed to hear appeals from the Ninth and Second Circuit
decisions during the current term. 423  The outcome of this appeal is
difficult to predict.4 24 Seen from a broad perspective, however, a legally
recognized right to die seems inevitable. An adverse Supreme Court
decision could hardly retard the process of change for more than a decade,
given the (i) emphasis on personal liberty in American society; the (ii)
increasing levels of support for the option of medically assisted suicide for
the terminally ill; and (iii) given the other legal developments reviewed in
this paper which have already undermined the sanctity of life ethic.
Legalized PAS is, of course, only the beginning. The recognized
importance of autonomy in medical decision-making supports a right to
direct euthanasia at the doctor's hand, as much as a right to PAS. Indeed,
advocates would argue that a prohibition upon the former discriminates
against those who are unable, physically, to do what is necessary to
achieve their own death, thus providing the grounds for a further Equal
Protection Clause challenge.
42 Id. at 729.
422 Id.
423 Supreme Court to Rule on Euthanasia, THE AGE (Melb.), Oct. 4, 1996, at A8. The United
States Supreme Court is scheduled to rule on the matter at the end of the term in late June or early July.
Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2 Cases Involving Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at
A].
424 However, as Professor Yale Kamisar has noted, the Supreme Court has already intimated
that laws against assisted suicide are examples of conduct between consenting adults which are not
beyond state regulation. Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: the Last Bridge to Active
Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 225, 227 (John Keown ed., 1995). See also, Robert
A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
725 (1995); cf Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form 72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 735 (1995).
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IV. THE CONTRADICTIONS THAT REMAIN: AN AUSTRALIAN
PERSPECTIVE
The developments which undermine the sanctity of life ethic,
reviewed in Part III, co-exist uneasily with the law's traditional prohibition
upon killing. In their attempt to uphold the sanctity of life ethic, as well as
give greater recognition to personal autonomy and quality of life
judgments,, legal systems are becoming internally inconsistent, and
intellectually misshapen. The precise problems which arise will vary
between jurisdictions. This Part provides a brief review of some current
tensions within Australian law.
A. Suicide and Murder in Australian Law
Suicide may be defined as a successful act of deliberate, and
intentional self-destruction. Suicide is a crime in the Northern Territory
(except where it is carried out in accordance with the Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act (1995)), but not elsewhere in Australia. 425  It is,
however, a crime to aid or abet the suicide or attempted suicide of another
person. 426 There seems little doubt that Jack Kevorkian's actions in setting
up a "death machine," or in rigging up carbon monoxide canisters for self-
administration, would amount to the crime of aiding and abetting suicide if
performed in Australia. In 1992, a sixty-two year-old Newcastle man was
sentenced to two hundred hours community service after a failed suicide
pact, in which the man's wife died after they both drank a cocktail of drugs
and alcohol prepared by the husband.4 27 Convictions still occur, and this
reflects the fundamental importance of the sanctity of life ethic within
criminal law.
Even where suicide is legal, a person is permitted to use reasonable
force to prevent a person from committing suicide.428 So there is no right
to be left alone to commit suicide, even when you do it all yourself.
A person wanting to commit suicide may do so in various ways.
There are books which can tell you how, such as Hemlock Society founder
Derek Humphry's controversial bestseller Final Exit.4 29 Nevertheless, it is
425 See, e.g., Crimes Act § 6A (1958) (Vict.); Crimes Act § 31A (1900) (N.S.W.). In the
United States, suicide and attempted suicide have not been criminal offenses for at least ten years.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810. A majority of States retain laws prohibiting assisted suicide.
42 See, e.g., Crimes Act (1958) (Vict.) § 6B(2); Crimes Act (1900) (N.S.W.) § 31C.
427 Natalie Williams, 200 Hours Community Service for Suicide Pact, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN,
Mar. 28-29, 1992, at 5.
42s See, e.g., Crimes Act § 463B (1958) (Vict.); Crimes Act § 574B (1900) (N.S.W.).
429 Derek Humphry, FINAL EXIT (199 I). Prior to FINAL EXIT, Humphry's LET ME DIE BEFORE
I WAKE (1981) was the major English language guide to voluntary euthanasia throughout the 1980s.
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notoriously difficult for a non-medically trained person to suicide
efficiently and painlessly, because of lack of access to drugs and ignorance
of correct dosage.43 If a person is not able-bodied, or lacks access to
drugs, the only way they may have of achieving their own death is by
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, or by convincing someone else
to intervene and end their life directly.
Murder in Australia can be committed either by a positive act, or by
omission. In addition, a person must have the requisite intention, or mens
rea.43' There is no distinction between "degrees" of murder. In Australia,
murder is defined by statute in all states except Victoria43 2 and South
Australia. In New South Wales, for example, the definition of murder
includes:
* causing a person's death with reckless indifference to human life, or
with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person;
or
* causing a person's death during the course of a crime punishable by
penal servitude for twenty-five years or life.433
Manslaughter is the name given for all unlawful homicides other
than murder. The act or omission which constitutes the offense is the same
in murder as in manslaughter, although the lesser charge may reflect a
variety of other mitigating factors. A person may be liable for
manslaughter when death is caused by his or her failure to provide
necessary assistance,434 including medical treatment, where he or she has a
duty to care for another person, or where he or she has undertaken such a
duty.
4 35
Against the background of this introduction, we will now focus on
two particular issues which have arisen through the uneasy blending
within the law of the sanctity of life ethic, and the recognition of personal
autonomy and quality of life judgments:
(1) In the first scenario, a patient is dependent upon, but wishes not to
receive, life-preserving medical treatment;
430 Rodney R. A. Syme, A Patient's Right to a Good Death, 154 MED. J. AUSTL. 203, 204
(1991).
431 Crimes Act § 18(l) (1900) (N.S.W.).
432 Murder under the common law, as in Victoria, requires proof of intent to cause death or
grievous bodily harm, or recklessness with respect to the same. See Crimes Act §3 (1958) (Vict.); R. v.
Russell, (1993) V.L.R. 59.
433 Crimes Act § 18(l) (1900) (N.S.W.).
434 See, e.g., R. v. Russell, (1993) V.L.R. 59.
435 See R. v. Taktak, (1988) 14 N.S.W.L.R 226; Regina v. Stone, 1 Q.B. 354 (1977).
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(2) In the second scenario, a patient requires such large amounts of drugs
to control pain or discomfort that the patient's life will, in consequence, be
shortened.
B. Suicide and the Refusal ofLife-Preserving Treatment
As discussed above, the right not to be subjected to unlawful assault
is the basis for the right to refuse medical treatment, and this right is
reflected in legislation in Australia and the United States, as well as under
the common law. Courts in England, Canada and the United States have
acknowledged that this right of self-determination may be exercized even
if the patient dies as a result. As one English judge, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said, "a mentally competent patient can at any time put an end
to life support systems by refusing his consent to their continuation. 4 36 In
one Canadian case, a doctor who administered blood to an unconscious
Jehovah's Witness, ignoring the card in her purse which stated that she did
not want blood to be administered under any circumstances, was held to be
guilty of battery. $20,000 damages were awarded for mental distress.437
Despite such graphic illustrations of the right to self-determination,
the right to refuse life-preserving treatment remains on a potential collision
course with the criminal law. What is the liability of a doctor whose
patient refuses the treatment upon which their life depends? If the doctor
does nothing, is the doctor aiding and abetting suicide if the doctor knows
that this is the patient's intention? This would depend on whether a person
can commit suicide by omission, for example, by not eating or by refusing
intravenous feeding.438
In the medical context, where a terminally ill patient refuses life-
preserving treatment, it is nowadays less likely that courts would regard
this as suicide, or would regard a doctor who respected the patient's desire
to forego life-sustaining treatment as aiding and abetting suicide. But the
issue becomes more sharply focused when a patient refuses food and
water. Refusing artificial nourishment and hydration is, after all, one of
the few ways patients have of speeding up their dying process when they
are terminally ill, yet wasting slowly. Naso-gastric feeding and
intravenous hydration are sometimes regarded differently from other forms
of medical treatment. The right to refuse treatment contained in Victoria's
Medical Treatment Act (1988), for example, excludes the reasonable
436 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [ 1993] App. Cas. 789.
437 Malette v. Shulman, [1987] 47 D.L.R. (4th) 18.
438 See Lanham, supra note 240, at 11 -12.
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provision of food and water.439 A more absolute right of refusal may
operate, however, under the common law of some countries.44 °
Nevertheless, if patients have the right to starve themselves to death, isn't
that suicide?
In 1983, a New South Wales court refused to grant an injunction
which would have prevented prison authorities from force-feeding a
prisoner who had been on a hunger strike. The Court refused the
injunction both because the prisons legislation permitted force-feeding,
and because any such injunction would have amounted to aiding and
abetting the prisoner's attempt to commit suicide.441 Similarly, in 1989 a
Victorian judge refused to grant an injunction which would have prevented
hospital doctors from operating on an unconscious man to discover the
source of bleeding in his throat. The man's wife said he wanted to die, and
he had taken a drug over-dose. Under the circumstances, however, an
injunction preventing the operation would have aided and abetted the
man's suicide.442 One can speculate whether the judge would have
decided differently if the man had previously made an advance directive
refusing medical treatment under the Medical Treatment Act (1988)
(Vict.). 443 As they stand, however, these cases are examples of how an
otherwise established, legal right of self-determination was curtailed
because of the underlying intention with which the act was done.
The facts of these cases demonstrate the doctor's dilemma-tom
between respecting the patient's legal right to self-determination as
embodied in case law and legislation on the one hand, and respecting the
sanctity -of life ethic as embodied in the criminal law's prohibition on
aiding and abetting suicide, on the other.4 44 These cases suggest that, in
Australia at least, the right to self-determination will not necessarily win
every time.445 At present, the most that can be said is that much depends
439 Medical Treatment Act §4 (1988) (Vict.).
440 See Bland, [1993] App. Cas. 789. The right to refuse intravenous food and water was
"assumed" (but also apparently accepted), by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), and by the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 814-816.
441 Schneidas v. Corrective Services Comm'n, 7 CRIM. L. J. 353 (1983).
442 In re Kinney, (S.Ct. Victoria, Dec. 23, 1988) (unreported opinion by Justice Fullagar);
Loane Skene, The Fullagar Judgment, 14 LEGAL SERVICE BULL. 42 (1989).
443 Medical Treatment Act (1988) (Vict.).
"4 To resolve this problem, legislation authorizing the force-feeding of a patient against his or
her will has sometimes been enacted; for example, where the patient is suffering a mental disorder (B.
v. Croydon Health Authority, I All E.R. 683 (1995)) or is under detention (Secretary, Dep't of
Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs v. Mok, No. 4982 (S.Ct. New South Wales, Sept. 30,
1992)).
445 Recent English cases, by contrast, indicate that the right of self-determination will prevail,
and will permit a patient (or prisoner) to refuse food and water for so long as they retain mental
capacity to do so. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't v. Robb, I All E.R. 677 (1995). As noted
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on the intention with which the treatment is refused. If the patient's
intention in refusing treatment, food or water, is to suicide, rather than
merely to avoid the burden of invasive treatment, or the pain associated
with treatment, the suicide provisions may be relevant. Similarly, if the
doctor's intention is to assist the patient in dying, rather than to ensure that
the patient's last days are dignified and free from pain or distress, then the
assisted suicide provisions may be relevant. In so far as these distinctions
make any sense, they send a message to those with terminal illnesses about
how they should frame their request for termination of life-sustaining
treatment, and to doctors about how they should describe any resulting
action which they take.
C. Murder, and Pain Relief
In the trial of Dr Adams, Justice Devlin told the jury that it is not
murder to hasten a patient's death by administering drugs when the
doctor's purpose and intention in giving the medication is to relieve pain
and suffering and when nothing else can be done. 446 The dividing line
between intending to relieve the pain of an exhausted and dying patient,
however, and intending to expedite their inevitable death, is as thin as
onion skin. As one leading Oregon physician commented: "[d]ying
patients are given larger and larger doses of morphine. We talk about the
'double effect,' and know jolly well we are sedating them into oblivion,
providing pain relief but also providing permanent relief, and we don't tell
them."
447
In Australia, administering a drug overdose in order to kill a
terminally ill patient is illegal (outside of the Northern Territory),
regardless of the patient's desire for it. In the eyes of the law, euthanasia is
murder.448 In this respect, as the Bland court recognized, "the interest of
the state in preserving life overrides the otherwise all-powerful interest of
patient autonomy., 449 In 1992, an eighty year-old Melbourne man was put
on a good-behavior bond for cutting his partly paralyzed wife's wrist after
previously, it was on this basis that an English woman with anorexia nervosa was recently allowed to
die. See Woman Suffering from Anorexia Inisists on Being Allowed to Die, supra note 257.
46 See Palmer, supra note 45; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
447 Paul Cotton, Medicine's Position is Both Pivotal and Precarious in Assisted-Suicide
Debate, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 363 (1995). Grimley Evans, Professor of Geriatric Medicine at
Oxford University, once said "doctors shrink from active euthanasia because they are trained to kill
only by accident." Tallis, supra note 156, at 3.
,4' The fact that a victim is terminally ill has never been recognized as a defence for homicide.
The King v. Dyson, 2 K.B. 454, 457 (1908); R. v. Pankotai, CRIM. L.R. 546 (1961).
"9 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 893.
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she had suffered a stroke.45 ° Mercy killing cases crop up far more
regularly than one might expect.4 "
The problem for health care workers is that as a patient's condition
worsens, such a quantity of sedatives may be needed to relieve pain or
distress that the doctor (or more frequently, the nurse) will inevitably come
to a point where they realise that the next injection will probably kill the
patient. At this point, an act of palliative care tumbles over the line to
become an act which precipitates death. While the doctor's intention is the
distinguishing characteristic, many health care workers and ordinary
people nevertheless have difficulty understanding the moral and legal
difference ten to thirty semi-lethal injections causing death over three to
seven days (perfectly legal pain relief), and death within an hour after one
lethal injection (euthanasia, murder).452
D. Other Anomalies
There are, of course, other consequences of the clash between the
traditional ethics of sanctity of life, and the new ethics of personal
autonomy and liberal individualism. Able bodied individuals may
lawfully commit suicide, but physically disabled individuals may not.
4 53
The ethics of the sanctity of life prevents an individual from assisting
others, whereas the ethics of self-determination allows individuals to kill
themselves. Similarly, the distinction relied upon in the Bland case-
between the withdrawal of life-support and active euthanasia-persists in
most countries. Furthermore, the Bland case also illustrates how English
law permits the withdrawal of nourishment from patients in a permanent
vegetative state, thus permitting them to starve to death.454 But to do
anything more than this, according to the courts, is to "cross the Rubicon
which runs between on the one hand the care of the living patient and on
the other hand euthanasia-actively causing his death to avoid or to end
his suffering".' Family and friends can only watch, often in great
distress, as the life force of their loved-one slowly fades.
Some will ask-where is the mercy? Where is the dignity? They
see the legal system in disarray, torn between competing ethical demands,
450 Peter Gregor, Bond for Husband in Mercy Killing Bid, THE AGE (Melb.), June 30, 1992, at
1.
451 See Margaret Otlowski, Mercy Killing Cases in the Australian Criminal Justice System, 17
CRIM. L.J. 10 (1993).
452 See Syme, supra note 430, at 204.
453 Euthanasia a Right, Given Safeguards, THE AGE (Melb.), Apr. 4, 1995, at 14 (letter).
45 Bland, [1993] App. Cas. at 869.
455 Id at 865.
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compelling a result they regard as cruel and unnecessary. It is their crie de
coeur which is fuelling the euthanasia debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should assisted suicide and euthanasia be legalized? A right to
PAS/AVE within a procedural framework embodying appropriate
safeguards may be preferable to the current abuses, personal tragedies and
primitive killings which constitute an alarming proportion of deaths in the
current, unregulated "euthanasia underground. ,45 6 As with prostitution in
jurisdictions where it remains illegal, what is prohibited cannot be
regulated. Health care workers currently practicing euthanasia are
accountable to no one. On the other hand, they are, in many cases, beating
or ignoring the legal system.457
The central argument of this paper, however, is that legalized
PAS/AVE is an inevitable development. Society and the law are moving
steadily in this direction. Levels of popular support, and to a lesser extent,
support within the medical profession, are now reaching levels where
PAS/AVE is widely seen as a human right. The Christian churches, many
of whom oppose euthanasia, themselves have declining influence in
matters of social policy and at least in Australia, are unlikely to
successfully retard the process of law reform for very long. Australia and
the United States provide interesting comparative models for euthanasia
law and policy. Both countries are industrialized, federal democracies
with a tradition of freedom and personal liberty. Both have legal systems
which have retreated in a variety of ways from the sanctity of life ethic to
the point where we are now witnessing an assault, unparalleled in history,
upon the legal relics which prohibit direct intervention to end the lives of
suffering patients.
Having come this far, the law can now only deny a legal right to die
by relying on distinctions such as the discredited act/omission distinction
in Bland.45 Accordingly, the logical movement of the law is towards
legalizing a right-to-die within a framework of safeguards.
456 The writer's view was formed largely during the process of ongoing interview-based
research on the practice of euthanasia in four Australian cities and San Francisco.
457 See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996).
458 Bland, [ 1993] App. Cas. at 898.
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A. The Slippery Slope and a Stable Philosophical Basis for PASIA VE
Reform
Important implications follow from this trend towards PAS
legalization. As Kamisar notes, within the American context, the right of a
terminally ill patient to PAS will not exhaust the push for a right to die.459
The logic of personal autonomy also demands AVE. Furthermore, as
community perceptions change, perhaps over time, there will also be a
right to die if one is constantly miserable, and a right to hasten the death of
incompetent persons who are perceived to be living in unbearable agony.
The long-term social consequences of tampering with the sanctity of life
ethic are serious and will not be easily undone. Doomsday rhetoric aside,
it is fundamental to articulate a stable philosophical basis for PAS/AVE
which will provide a clear basis for any further, incremental derogations
from the sanctity of life ethic.
The survey of developments undermining the sanctity of life ethic in
this paper suggests two quite different philosophical underpinnings of the
right to die. The first is personal autonomy. Seen through libertarian
lenses, the conflict generated by the euthanasia debate is between a
"communitarian" world view where social goals and values circumscribe
aspects of individual freedom, and a more individualistic world view
where personal choice within the personal sphere trumps social values.
Society's increasing moral commitment to personal autonomy is reflected
in caselaw and legislation recognizing a right to refuse medical treatment,
including life-support where death will inevitably follow. Personal
autonomy as a basis for the right to die provides no logical basis for
limiting that right to patients in "unbearable pain," or in the "terminal
stages" of an illness. If anything, the fixation upon pain and suffering as a
justification for PAS/AVE merely sweetens the thin end of the wedge; it
provides a selling-point for a radical philosophy of individual autonomy
whose logical conclusion is a right to assisted suicide simpliciter. If
personal autonomy is the only justification for PAS/AVE reform, then the
deep implications of this should be frankly acknowledged and debated in a
way which has not occurred to date.
Personal autonomy does not, however, explain all the legal
developments which have undermined the sanctity of life ethic. The re-
definition of death to include "whole-brain death," and the legal
permission to withdraw life-support from patients in a permanent
459 Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia,
in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 225, 233-36 (John Keown ed., 1995); Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted
Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 737, 739 (1995).
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vegetative state is more paternalistic in character, since it has nothing
whatsoever to do with the known wishes of the individual. These
developments constitute, essentially, a judgment imposed from outside
that in certain circumstances life itself is futile, or has become so
attenuated that further existence would serve no useful purpose.
If the personal autonomy basis for euthanasia points to a radical and
distressing notion of liberty which devalues our intuitions and beliefs
about the value and goodness of life, a judgment about the quality or
futility of life, imposed upon the individual from outside, might be thought
to carry even more chilling implications. This need not be the case,
provided a "paternalistic quality of life" judgment that justifies the
withdrawal of life-support operates only where an individual is
permanently unconscious and unaware. On the other hand, if this
"paternalistic judgment" model operates for life and death decisions in
circumstances where the individual is conscious and competent, then it
may provide a useful check against the implications of an ethic of radical
personal autonomy. For example, the judgment that no useful purpose is
served by enduring the excruciating pain and suffering accompanying
certain terminal illnesses may provide one context where society chooses
to recognize an individual's otherwise expressed desire to die.
This paper seeks to offer little to the philosophical debates over
euthanasia except to demonstrate how the law already embodies two
different models of "justification" for PAS/AVE reform. More work is
needed to draw out the philosophical implications of current legal
developments, and to develop philosophical models which might limit
further derogations from the sanctity of life ethic within boundaries society
considers to be acceptable. It is important to recognize, however, that
PAS/AVE reform is currently being sold to the public on the basis of
personal liberty operating, albeit, within limited circumstances where
terminal disease and extreme pain compromises quality of life. As the
Ninth Circuit majority concluded its opinion in Compassion in Dying:
Those who believe strongly that death must come without
physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they
doctors or patients. They are not free, however, to force their
views, their religious convictions, or their philosophies on
all the other members of a democratic society, and to
compel those whose values differ with theirs to die painful,
protracted, and agonizing deaths.46 °
46 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 893.
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B. The Need for Euthanasia Policy to be Informed by Research
If it is true that society is steadily moving towards PAS/AVE
reform, then in addition to being clear over the legal and philosophical
bases on which legalization is premised, it is also important to ensure that
any regulatory regime is informed by research. More research is needed
on the current practice of euthanasia, both legal and illegal, in order to
generate deeper understanding of the respective advantages and
disadvantages of prohibition. American and Australian survey studies
were useful in making generalizations about trends in attitudes and
behaviour.46" ' However, they provide little understanding of the
complexity of attitudes towards euthanasia generated by close involvement
in end of life decisions, the conditions under which euthanasia is practiced,
how it is carried out, and its impact upon HCWs. This kind of data,
obtained best through interview-based techniques, is useful in pointing out
the price of prohibition, and in identifying issues which would need to be
considered in a responsible regulatory regime. The myths of euthanasia
should be exposed, and unrealistic fears soothed. Good social policy must
proceed on knowledge, and if PAS/AVE reform proceeds, such knowledge
must be built into protective regulatory regimes. The appropriate vehicle
for creating such a regime is, in the writer's view, the legislature. Such a
controversial change in the moral and legal fabric of society as PAS/AVE
entails deserves nothing less than democratic reform.
In conclusion, one would hope that the fragility of patients in the
midst of pain and existential anguish will be recognized, and that as a
society, regardless of law reform, we will seek to emphasize the value and
meaning of life, and to provide the best available care. The provision of
palliative care, and the development and funding of this speciality
provides a telling basis for judging society's commitment to life in an era
when a growing, aging population is taking longer to die.
461 Supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
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